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DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
REFLECTIONS ON THE COSTA RICAN CASE

By Dennis J. Gayle

Introduction

What is particularly interesting about Costa Rican trade policy is that the showpiece of Central American democracy maintained increasingly extensive market controls, during the sixties and the seventies. This small, middle-income developing-country case contradicts the traditional and still rather general assumption that domestic democracy correlates well with an open economy, at and above a median level of economic growth.(1) Such observations demand more convincing explanations than those related solely to theories of either inescapable dependent development routes, or persistently faulty macro-economic policy formulation and implementation, as independent variables affecting the politico-economic system.

I intend to develop such explanations by means of an inter-disciplinary trade policy systems approach, focusing upon 1960-1982 state policies governing the import and export of manufactured goods. After defining the trade policy system as an heuristic construct, and discussing the basic implications of system structure and environment for trade policy at a deductive level, this paper presents a functional model of the Costa Rican trade policy system. In a search for understanding, and ultimately perhaps also foresight, it goes on to analyze the principal relationships between the socio-economic and political characteristics of the republic and the observed trade policy outcomes, in a theory infirming study which also indicates an alternative conceptual framework.

The Trade Policy System

The trade policy system includes all those political and administrative actors who relate to each other with such regularity, in the process of trade policy formulation and implementation, within a specific political structure and culture,(2) that

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a relatively stable pattern of action may be discerned. The boundaries are maintained by the Customs, Immigration and Central Bank subsystems. Imports of goods and services of all kinds translate naturally into inputs, and exports into outputs. However, inputs and outputs also include a range of specific policy influences. These are intended to maintain or to alter the nature of the system and the systemic environment, respectively, by means of affecting the extent, composition and direction of trade.

The environment of this system consists of other trade policy systems, together with the international trade regime. The nexus between system and environment affords net trade policy opportunities, as a function of the relevant information available to each actor, the degree to which the environment retards or facilitates particular trade flows, and the extent to which policy formulation is creative, and implementation effective. Technically simple trade policies with clear goals and relatively short time-frames, involving incremental changes, are more likely to be successful than in the reverse cases.(3)

At figure one, I present a model of the Costa Rican trade policy system. The political executive, together with the national trade bureaucracy, comprise the managerial subsystem. The boundary subsystems administer tariff and non-tariff barriers, as well as financial controls, as directed, and are also responsible for the implementation of market liberalization. Export promotion and import contols coexist. During the seventies and early eighties this system increased in institutional complexity. The managerial subsystem included the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Economy, Industry and Commerce, the Bank of Costa Rica, the Center for Export and Investment Promotion, the Customs Administration and the Costa Rican Development Corporation.

There were supportive subsystems, such as the Chambers of Commerce and of Industry, which also acted as powerful interest groups, continuously influencing trade policy decisions. Indeed, such was the degree of functional decentralization that a dysfunctional redundancy was the rule. For political and bureaucratic decision-makers, either apathetic inertia or improvisation was the name of the game. Within the republic, much of what is consumed domestically has typically been imported, as there is a persistently high import coefficient. Retailers and wholesalers tend to relate much more to importing, rather than

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to manufacturing or to agricultural interests.

There are three major productive subsystems: services, agriculture and industry. The link between trade policy formulation and implementation, on the one hand, and the sociopolitical and economic aspects of the trade policy system on the other, is threefold. Political structure directly affects decision-making style and policy choice. Political culture conditions both policy formulation and implementation. The point is that the dominant value orientations existing within a society tend either to limit, or to enhance, the creation and pursuit of net trade policy opportunities. National social organization is organically related to both political structure and culture. The domestic resource base, together with the availability of relevant technology and skills, and the size and structure of the domestic market, offer objective possibilities and constraints for trade policy.

Sociological Aspects of the Trade Policy System

Social development implies increasingly complex patterns of identification and interaction. Groups proliferate. Individuals become more socially mobile, and less politically parochial. Membership in many other institutional and associational groups besides the family becomes the norm. Occupation becomes more important than class. At the same time, there is a growing array of classes, societal roles, and statueses, until a society may be characterized as a continuous bell-shaped pyramid, with the widest stratum in the middle. To use Parsonian terminology, ascriptive, diffuse and particularistic criteria tend to be replaced by achievement, specific and universalistic alternatives. Patrimonial authority forms are replaced by impersonality, rationality and bureaucracy. This continues to be a useful typology, suitably qualified by a rejection of its unilinear and deterministic connotations. Accordingly, the first point to be made about the sociological aspects of the trade policy system is that family and class have remained the most critical independent variables influencing Costa Rican self-concepts. A large majority of individuals can be characterized as immobile and largely passive in outlook.

The Costa Rican educational system once functioned as a tension management mechanism for the society. Only five per cent of the population completed high school during the

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early 1960s. In 1965, less than one per cent of all *Ticos* (4) had attended a university for one or more years, so that the number of highly trained white collar workers was limited to a trickle. High status employment was thus assured to all graduates.(5) However, by 1980, 48% of all 12-17 year old youths were enrolled in high school, and 26% of all young men and women between the ages of 20-24 were enrolled in tertiary educational institutions. At that point, Costa Rica reported a 90% adult literacy rate. But the educational process may still be seen as both the key to vertical social mobility and a major agent of political socialization. If the primary school system may be said to have produced working class parochials, the private high schools have fostered relatively high levels of political competence.

Immigration from the Spanish provinces of Andalucia and Extremadura has profoundly influenced the sociological development of Costa Rica. Ethnically, the Costa Rican people are the most homogenous nation in Central America, and this has facilitated the overall evolution of a sense of national identity.(6) Despite this, as discussed later, subnational ethnic identifications have helped to limit the emergence of what has been styled a political society.(7) The family unit is typically tightly knit, with rather sharply defined roles for each member. The nuclear family is large, usually numbering ten or more members. A nationwide family planning campaign was slow in gaining many adherents. In 1960, the birth rate was one of the highest in Latin America, at 47 per thousand. After a period of sustained decline, the 1981 birth rate stood at 30 per thousand. On the other hand, since the mid-seventies, some 44% of the population has been under 15 years of age, leading to a high dependant-worker ratio.

Family heritage is the source of both identification and status for the individual, as illustrated by the retention of maiden names by women after marriage, and the use of both paternal and maternal names for children. The rural nuclear family fulfills a larger number of roles than its urban counterpart. In many isolated areas, it is the primary agent of socialization, as well as the basic economic unit, within which everyone works toward the maintenance of the family. The existence of a large middle class is an heritage of the colonial era, when small, independent farmers dominated the population. By the end of

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the sixties, the rural middle class was decreasing in numbers, as many of the independent farmers had been forced off the land by the expansion of large coffee plantations and cattle pastures. Indeed, the story of the Costa Rican peasantry has been described as that of a social group moving from landed to landless status.(8)

The most distinct class systems are to be found in the cities. More amorphous social structures exist in the rural areas. Catholicism is the state religion, and is taught in all public schools, The state contributes one per cent of the national budget to the Roman Catholic Church. Ninety-five per cent of the population is Catholic, and this religion permeates the society, influencing all national traditions. The dominant social values are Hispanic, emphasizing personalism and *machismo*, alongside education and discipline. The favorite Tico character is not the aristocratic conquistador, but the independent, middle-class farmer, who cultivates his own land. The continuing disappearance of such farmers has helped to foster a profound uncertainty as to the role of traditional values and concepts. There is also a strain of fatalism, again associated with the Hispanic tradition and also with folk Catholicism. Both success and failure have traditionally been attributed to the will of God, and to luck or misfortune, *mutatis mutandis*.

Nearly a fifth of all Costa Ricans live in the Pacific northwest, where the people are a blend of colonial Spanish, Indian, and Negro. Adherence to Catholicism is often nominal, and the local dialect is more Nicaraguan than anything else. African ancestry is strongest in the province of Limón, in the eastern Caribbean lowlands, which contain only about six per cent of the population. Most blacks speak both Spanish and a Jamaican patois, having originated in that Caribbean island. The black population is primarily Anglican, and tend to ignore most national celebrations. In the far south, a few thousand Indians remain, speaking several languages related to the Chibcha speech of Colombia. As a result of their relative isolation, the Caribbean groups still observe most of their traditions and customs, whereas the Pacific settlements are more directly influenced by the dominant culture of the *meseta central*. The political attitudes and orientations of Black and Indian Costa Ricans thus limited the development of consensus as to the domain of political action.

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The central plateau consists of some 770 square miles of fairly level terrain, at an elevation of 3,000-4,000 feet above sea level. The capital city of San José (1970 population 436,900), the three smaller cities of Alajuela, Cártago, and Heredia, and a large number of smaller towns, are all concentrated on the plateau. In 1976, local population density was 188 per square mile, as against 18 for the rest of the country. Two-thirds of all secondary education establishments, and of all hospitals, together with somewhere between seveyty per cent and ninety-five per cent of all professionals(9) are to be found in this area. Accordingly, there is a major disequilibrium between the central plateau and the remainder of the country, in socio-economic and political terms.

Political Aspects of the Trade Policy System

The government of Costa Rica has suffered from problems of penetration (10), in the sense that the political executive has has no effective presence in all major issue-areas at any time, while the national trade bureaucracy has yet to become a truly professional and autonomous administrative group. The government of this liberal democratic state is presidential in form, with separate executive, legislative and judicial branches. Presidential strength depends largely on the personality of the incumbent, and his popularity. Presidential control over the executive branch of the government has been weakened by a proliferation of semi-autonomous administrative institutions, which have, in effect, become a fourth branch of government, as a result of their constitutional status. New autonomous institutions may be created by a vote of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly.

Individual boards of directors formulate their own policies, and these organizations are often self-financing. In a few cases, administrative bodies have been guaranteed a specified percentage of the national budget. By the late sixties, fifty per cent of all governmental expenditures were made by such bodies, which were involved in a wide range of sectors, including banking, insurance, railroads, housing, electricity generation and tourism promotion.(11) During the 1982-1983 fiscal year, the executive branch of the government was attempting to reduce autonomous agency budgets by 10%, and to stabilize central government spending. All public expenditure must be author-

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ized by the Comptroller-General, who is appointed to an eight-year term by the National Assembly, and is essentially independent of executive influence. Similarly, the National Budget Authority, which deals with public sector budgeting and tax administration, is responsible to the Legislature. Further, the seventeen Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the National Assembly for eight year terms. The Legislature has the constitutional authority to call Ministers to account, and to censure them by a two-thirds vote of the deputies present.

The Partido de Liberacion Nacional (PLN) has been the dominant political party in Costa Rica since 1953, holding the National Assembly consistently during the sixties and seventies, if only by a few seats sometimes. This trend was continued by the February 1982 electoral victory of President Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez, when the PLN won an absolute legislative majority. As a party, is is strongly programmatic in regard to economic development and social reform. The PLN has committed itself to a mixed economy in which the government plays a major role, whenever necessary for further developmental goals. Its platform has persistently called for agrarian reform, better educational facilities, increased agro-industrial productivity, export diversification, and the negotiation of better international terms of trade. Together with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Costa Rica is a member of the "Central American Democratic Community." The republic has also been active within a group of nine Caribbean Basin Countries, whose governments have ineffectively sought to act as regional peacemakers.

The major opposition party has been a coalition known as the Partido de Unificacion Nacional, which has tended to be more conservative than the PLN, emphasizing market liberalization and the reduction of state intervention in the economy. For the politically and administratively competent, Costa Rican political life is very informal. The attentive public experiences little difficulty in remaining abreast of all major political events and issues. A number of effective pressure groups, such as the powerful Coffee Growers' Association and the Cattlemens' Trade Association, maintain close contact with the most influential Deputies. As a result, whenever declared state policies arouse negative perceptions, it has often been possible for affected interest groups to alter policy at the implementation

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stage. For example, a long pursued official policy of agricultural diversification was translated into price supports for large agro-export interests.(12)

Costa Rican political leaders must appeal to public opinion, and must make commitments in return for political support. This has made politicians vulnerable to pressures from a range of interest groups and unions, including the National Association of Educators and the National Association of Public Employees. Consequently, governmental programs have tended to emphasize short range objectives, which can be understood and agreed upon fairly easily. Longer range goals, involving major socio-economic changes, have less often been formulated, and have been much harder to implement. In general, the state has been weak, whenever it has attempted to exert pressures that directly affect private interests.

Appointments to the national trade bureaucracy need not be competitive, under the Civil Service Statute, which was promulgated by law number 1581 of May 30, 1953. Bureaucrats may be dismissed for a variety of reasons, which may be quite unrelated to competence.(13) Although posts in the national bureaucracy are classified, in accordance with a 1957 plan, a great deal of weight has continued to be given to seniority. Further, the semi-autonomous agencies have never been included in the scope of this classification scheme. Senior bureaucratic appointments have often been subject to political agreements between the major parties, rather than to individual merit.

Economic Aspects of the Trade Policy System

Sustained economic development must be predicated upon the necessary but insufficient condition of political stability.(14) Industrialization and the effective promotion of manufactured exports is a *sine qua non* of economic growth, which, in turn, has a set of socio-economic and political prerequisites and requisites. These include:

(a) an explicit and implemented system of national law;
(b) an accepted system of property rights;
(c) established rules for governmental succession;
(d) widespread administrative and political competence;
(e) competitive individual incentives to produce and export;
(f) a relatively coherent national identity.

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It should be noted that the implementation of laws, rules and regulations implies state penetration, while the growth of administative and political competence is related to the frequency of individual membership in cross-cutting institutional and associational groups.

Manufacturing industry is subject to increasing returns to scale, cumulative learning effects, and has an exceptionally high growth potential. The international trade regime presents both opportunities for manufactured exports and operational constraints. At the domestic level, there may also be supply limitations, rooted in organizational and administrative disabilities, within both the public and private sectors, as in the case of Costa Rica, where trade policy decision-makers have sought to encourage the export of processed local primary products and labor intensive goods, in particular.

Costa Rican gross domestic product grew at an annual average rate of some six per cent throughout the period under review, with industry as the leading sector, although growth slowed in the 1970s. However, the balance of payments on current account steadily worsened, and the level of external public debt mounted. The average annual inflation rate increased from 1.9% in 1960 to 15.4% in 1979. Consumer prices leapt from 18.1% in 1980 to an estimated 37% in 1981.(15) This ensued within an essentially agricultural and service economy, which may be characterized as highly trade-dependent, with a .31 ratio of imports to gross domestic product.(16) Some 70% of exports are usually accounted for by primary products: coffee (23%), bananas (24%), beef (7%), cocoa and sugar. In 1980, gross receipts from tourism amounted to $87 million.

Manufacturing contributes nearly one-fifth of the national income, and involves little more than a tenth of the 1,339,890 labor force. Chemicals account for some six per cent of exports, and industrial production includes cement, fertilizers, petroleum products and hydroelectric power. Labor has been heavily service-oriented, with the proportion involved in the service sector rising from 30% in 1960 to 48% in 1980 (industrial employment rose from 19% to 23%), but the income distribution pattern has not changed very much over this time. The Gini coefficient of family income was a middling .45 in 1971, when the highest 20% of Costa Rican households received 54.8% of all household income. A 1973 study indicated that the mean real income in the metropolitan area was nearly six times

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that of the rural areas.(17) Fifty-two per cent of the industrial workforce is still concentrated in the *Valle Central.* Table One presents a selection of basic economic indicators.

In 1960, the Costa Rican government promulgated an industrial development law, which was intended to promote new industries by means of tax and import duty exemptions, tariff protection, and state guarantees for domestic and foreign loans. In 1962, import controls protecting firms operating under the industrial development legislation were tightened by the imposition of a duty of not less than 75% of total c.i.f. value. By 1963, Costa Rican manufacturing industry employed 41,000 workers, almost half in the foodstuffs sector.

There were then five national banks, each specializing in a particular banking sector. Since private banks could not receive deposits, a national banking monopoly was assured. It is worth noting that traditional monetary policy has tended to emphasize currency stability, as compared with credit availability for small farmers and businessmen. In practice however, M^1 (cash and demand deposits) grew boisterously, particularly during the seventies,(18) with direct implications for real interest rates, wage rates and manufacturing output. Domestic public and private sector credit also expanded, from 11.8% in 1979 to 15.1% in 1981. This encouraged both gross domestic investment (9.1% average annual growth) and ever higher levels of consumer good imports.

Back in 1965, when total industrial investment was estimated at 180 million colones, or US $17.2m., the five Central American Common Market Ministers of Economy had agreed upon a joint statement of principles in regard to foreign investment, seeking to encourage the inflow of foreign capital in export industries that utilized a high proportion of local raw materials (19), in particular. At this stage, the Central Bank of the Republic was empowered to impose detailed import controls. A dual exchange rate was in operation from 1967 to 1969. Meanwhile, the value of Costa Rican industrial output doubled, during the decade to 1968, yielding one of the highest growth rates in Latin America.

This outcome was not unrelated to the level of foreign investment in the manufacturing sector, and the implementation of industrial development legislation, but the membership of the country in the Central American Common Market (CACM)

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after 1963 was even more important. During the sixties, the CACM was considered to be the most successful attempt at developing country integration in the developing world, as trade among member countries increased tenfold.(20) For Costa Rica, the CACM was second only to the United States as both an import source and an export market. The value of all Costa Rican manufactured exports rose from $2.4 m. in 1962 to $42 m. in 1969, when they accounted for almost a quarter of total export proceeds. By 1970, total industrial investment was $43.6 m. The bulk of manufacturing industry continued to produce consumer goods. A consistent pattern of intraregional trade was emerging, with Costa Rican export performance better than that of Honduras only, as demonstrated in Table Two, which deals with member country export shares between 1970-1972.

Apart from food processing and beverage production, the major industries are chemicals, textiles, plastics and the production of wood and leather products. Most industrial establishments are small. Industry is also highly concentrated on the central plateau, where over 80% of all firms are located, around the capital, and in an industrial estate on the highway between San José and Cártago. In 1973, a new development corporation (CODESA) was formed to plan and to implement development projects, and to facilitate industrial development, with an initial focus upon food processing and metalworking opportunities. A special fund to finance industrial projects and manufactured exports was then established. The criteria for the offer of incentives included the use of local raw materials for export or for import substitution, and job creation. In 1974, exports of manufactured goods became Costa Rica's principal foreign exchange earner.(21)

A national committee for the coordination of industrial development was set up in 1975. Feasibility studies on the establishment of two industrial estates in the cities of Alajuela and Limón were initiated, and a revolving loan fund to promote industrial exports put in place. Exporters were allowed to maintain discretionary foreign exchange accounts — up to the level of 5% of total export earnings — and customized sectoral incentives were developed. These were particularly effective in the floricultural industry. By 1977, CODESA had interests in a wide range of industrial, mining, and agricultural sectors. However, as the seventies ended, industrial output continued to be

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constrained by a number of traditional structural problems.

The size of the domestic market was limited, and the future of the Central American Common Market uncertain. Consequently, entrepreneurs hesitated to expand existing plants, or to establish new facilities. Industrial activities were oriented primarily towards the final stages of consumer goods production. Since this required high proportions of imported inputs, domestic value-added was inevitably reduced, and the balance of payments was adversely affected. Table Three analyzes the industrial development process in Costa Rica. If value-added in manufacturing more than doubled between 1970 and 1980, primary commodities continued to account for almost all exports (despite the growth of manufactured export value to $354 million), and manufactured goods accounted for some 75% of all imports.

It was in 1950 that Costa Rica last had a favorable balance of trade. Since then, imports have consistently grown faster than exports, leading to an ever-widening trade deficit. By the late seventies, merchandise imports were growing at an annual rate of 29%, primarily as a result of increased effective demand for consumer durables. Initially, import licenses were not required, except in the case of countertrade. On the other hand, in principle, all exports had to be licensed by the Central Bank. This was used as a means of forcing exporters to surrender foreign exchange proceeds at the official rate. Traditionally the two most important export items have been sugar and coffee, which must receive additional licenses from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and the Coffee Bureau, repectively. Lumber, basic foods, strategic materials and a number of miscellaneous items must also be licensed for export by other agencies. Freight and insurance costs have represented additional drains on the balance of payments, since most traded items have been transported on foreign vessels.

In January 1976, a "temporary" import tariff surcharge was imposed, as a result of the chronic deficit on the balance of payments, and high selective consumption taxes were introduced. It was planned to use the proceeds to finance the promotion of non-traditional exports, particularly those which utilized local raw materials. The funds were administered by a newly created Exports and Tourism Promotional Fund. Tax credit certificates equal to 15% of f.o.b. value were made available through this agency to exporters of manufactured

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goods. At this stage, manufactured goods consituted one-third of all export proceeds, followed by coffee (26%) and bananas (25%). After 1977, coffee export proceeds declined sharply. Table Four provides details of export and import values, together with trade balances, over the 1960-1981 period (in millions of 1980 US dollars) as well as significant external debt indicators, international reserve levels and foreign trade taxes as percentages of central government revenues. Imports continued to rise, from a value of $658 million in August 1977 to $779 million a year later, despite the countervailing measures taken. Real GDP growth decelerated dramatically, from 6.3% in 1978 to 0.6% in 1980 to −3.6% in 1981.

The Chamber of Commerce called for an end to formal membership of the Central American Common Market, to be replaced by bilateral ties with individual countries. These demands were resisted by the Chamber of Industry, whose members depended heavily on exports to the regional market. In the event, major tariff reductions on extra-regional imports were effected. The intention was to reduce the cost of living, and to discourage Ticos from travelling abroad (particularly to Panama) in order to purchase consumer goods. Other Common Market members agreed not to retaliate, although they were entitled to apply a stabilization tax to imports of any such goods from Costa Rica, under the San Juan Protocol.

Nevertheless, by the summer of 1980, it was impossible for the government to meet interest payments (amounting to $30 million) on the republic's external public debt of $2.6 billion. Meanwhile, the level of unemployment had risen to more than 12%.(22) In the face of a massive annual trade deficit, estimated at over $600 million, shock balance of payments measures were introduced; The Bank of Costa Rica decreed that it would require registration of all imports, as well as a prior import deposit ranging from ten to fifty per cent of import value, which must remain in the Central Bank for six months, at no interest. Non-essential imports were banned. Surcharges were imposed upon most items.(23) The colon was effectively devalued, and a three-tier exchange rate was instituted in late 1982: official (US $1.00 = 20), commercial (US $1.00 = 40), and open market (US $1.00 = 69). At that point, it was reported that the net foreign exchange reserves of the republic had dwindled from a 1969 level of $165 million to minus $188 million, and the nation's external debt totalled more than $3

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billion. In late 1983, Costa Rica signed an agreement with some 220 international creditor banks, rescheduling principal payments over seven and a half years on $630 million either past due or falling due before the end of 1974. The republic undertook to become current by the end of 1983 on some $350 million in interest payments, while creditor banks would provide about $200 million in revolving trade credits.(24) Since Costa Rica's 1982 export proceeds were only $896 million, within the context of a projected total external debt cost of $5 billion by 1990, the margin for optimism was somewhat limited.

Conclusion

For small, relatively resource-poor economies, the creation and exploitation of the maximum possible number of net trade policy opportunities for manufactured exports is imperative for economic growth. Since such growth can be neither automatic or expansionist (25) by definition, the efficiency and effectiveness of state policy, and the level of societal responsiveness are most important independent variables. Accordingly, the nature and level of social and political development must be considered at the same time as domestic economic structure and processes are analyzed. Costa Rican state policies governing trade in manufactured goods have attempted to facilitate the transformation of a small, essentially agrarian and service economy into a more industrial economy. Yet the state has been ill equipped to handle long-range, autonomous goals, involving major socio-economic changes.

In terms of political structure, the trade policy system has been dominated by the legistlature, which has control of both the National Budget Authority and the Comptroller General. Presidential ability to influence the promulgation of rules and regulations has varied with personality and popularity. Within the national trade bureaucracy, institutional differentiation has mushroomed. A trade policy problem was apt to be met by the creation of a new organization. Bureaucratic response was often either apathetic inertia or improvisation. Accordingly, the gap between policy formulation and implementation has yawned wide.

Costa Rican political stability is potentially problematic. The state has displayed limited political capacity within an underdeveloped society, characterized by a number of effective

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special interest groups and labor unions, on the one hand, and a growing majority of fatalistic, politically cynical or parochial individuals on the other. In terms of national social organization, family and class affiliations have continued to be more important than occupation and ability. A traditional consensus as to the appropriate domain of political action was replaced by polarization between elite and non-elite groups. In any case, there has long been a major socio-economic and political disequilibrium between the central plateau and the remainder of the country. Meanwhile, the economy has continued to be essentially innocent of significant vertical and horizontal linkages. As a result, net trade policy opportunities for manufactured goods were not often created or utilized. Even within the Central American Common Market, export performance had foundered by the close of the 1960s.

In the domestic trade policy system, rules and regulations have often been issues of form, rather than of implemented reality. Information flows and interest group demands upon the state have not infrequently been in direct conflict. Centrifugal, rather than centripetal forces were probably the more important in both polity and economy (and increasingly so in society) at the beginning of the 1980s. Dysfunctional interactions reinforced each other. Domestic democracy became correlated with an increasingly illiberal international trade policy. The imposition of more and more salient import and export controls appeared to political and bureaucratic trade policy decision-makers as the line of least resistance in a necessarily defensive game. Although further case study evidence is required, it is clear that open polities and closing economies are not mutually incompatible phenomena in small developing states.

The utility of the trade policy system as a construct is that it focuses attention upon a specific set of institutional actors, relating to each other within a discrete environment. Multiplier effects are emphasized and the use of interdisciplinary concepts, data and methods is facilitated. Yet the employment of systems terminology can obscure the importance of government as an act of will on the part of state decision-makers. On the other hand, the nature of the international trade regime merits far greater attention than is practicable in this paper, (particularly at the microanalytic level) to the operational opportunities and constraints, especially during the 1970s and the 1980s where specific Costa Rican manufactured exports were concerned.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) For example, see Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, Yale Univeristy Press, 1971. In a 1972 APSA paper, Jonathan Sunshine argued that a threshold of 1960 US$300-600 could be established, at least for the countries of western and northern Europe, over 1830-1930. Also see Robert W. Jackman, "On the Relation of Economic Development to Democratic Performance," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* Volume 17, pages 611-21, 1973.

(2) Political culure has suffered from problems of vagueness and content validity. There is now some consensus that it includes (a) popular interpretations of national political experience; (b) fundamental value orientations and political beliefs; (c) familiarity with political structure; (d) political self-concepts and judgements as to the appropriate scope of governmental action. See Archie Brown, "Introduction" to Archie Brown and Jack Gray, Editors, *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979.

(3) Adapted from Peter S. Cleaves, in Merle S. Grindle, Editor, *Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World*, Princeton University Press, 1980.

(4) Costa Ricans call themselves "Ticos" as a result of their distinctive habit of using double diminutives, so that *poquito* becomes *poquitico*, for example.

(5) See Charles F. Denton, *Patterns of Costa Rican Politics*, Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1971, page 5.

(6) National identity is used in an associational and territorial sense.

(7) Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, Humanities Press, 1965.

(8) See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian Capitalism*, pp. 88-95, University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.

(9) Carlos Melendez Chaverri, "El Medio Geographico," in Chester Zelaya, Editor, *Costa Rica Contemporaneo* (tomo I), San Jose, Editorial Costa Rica, 1979, page 64.

(10) Penetration is an issue of state capacity in relation to societal demands and governmental objectives.

(11) Charles F. Denton, op. cit., page 36.

(12) George M. Guess, "Pasture Expansion, Forestry and Developing Contradictions: The Case of Costa Rica," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring 1979, pp. 49-50.

(13) See Louis Fougere, *Civil Service Systems*, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, UNESCO, Paris, 1967, pp. 43-46.

(14) Political stability is used as a multidimensional concept, connoting system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy and effectiveness, following Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, 1977.

(15) Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America*, 1982 Report, Washington, D.C., 1982, page 227.

(16) UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, New York, 1976, table 1.2.

(17) John Booth, *Caracteristicas Sociograficas de las Regiones Perifericas de Costa Rica*, Instituto De Fomento Y Asesoria Municipal, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1974, page 6.

(18) See Vincente Galbis, "Inflation: the Latin American Experience, 1970-1979," in *Finance and Development*, September 1982, Volume 19, Number 3, IMF/IBRD, table 1. He argues that much Costa Rican inflation in the seventies was caused by increases in import prices.

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(19) Business International Corporation, *The Central American Common Market: Profits and Problems in an Integrating Economy*, New York, July 1969, page 30.

(20) Economist Intelligence Unit, *Quarterly Economic Report: Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama*, Annual Supplement 1979, page 5.

(21) Inter-American Development Bank, *Economic and Social Progress in Latin America – 1977*, Washington, D.C., 1977, pages 207-208.

(22) *Wall Street Journal*, October 29, 1981, pages 1, 16.

(23) *Business Latin America*, October 8, 1980, pages 323-327.

(24) *Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 1983.

(25) See Bert Hoselitz, "Social Implications of Economic Growth," in Walter L. Johnson and David R. Kamerschen, Editors, *Readings in Economic Development*, Southwestern Publishing Company, 1972, page 73.

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PATTERNS OF COALITION FORMATION AND TYPES OF PARTY SYSTEMS

By Giora Goldberg

Introduction

Coalition theories describe, explain and predict patterns of coalition formation. The basic elements in these theories are: the nature of the bargaining processes; the size of the coalitions; their ideological range and the methods of payoff apportionments among the partners.(1) Attempts to analyze patterns of coalition formation in Israel led to the conclusion that the Israeli case cannot easily be understood by using formal coalition theories. De Swaan tried ten theoretical versions on the Israeli case and concluded by claiming that "Israel is a difficult country for the (coalition) theories."(2) Seliktar describes Israel as an "abnormal" case, and "a very deviant one."(3) Nachmias tries to explain the failure because of the type of the existing party system.(4) He claims that in a dominant party system, formal coalition theories are not useful. A bargaining process characterized by coalition formation through a chain of stages as described by Riker does not exist in a dominant party system, where bargaining occurs between the dominant party – holding the veto power – and every other partner separately. The sheer weight of the dominant party prevents significant bargaining among the other partners. The dominant party (Alignment), is able to dictate three basic conditions to its potential partners: its absolute majority in the cabinet; its control of the five most important ministries; and the prevention of the second strongest party (Gahal-Likud) to have access to the major sites of governmental decision making. One of the implications of such a bilateral bargaining process is a heavy disproportion in payoff apportionments to the smaller partners. The dominant party tends to form large, ideologically diverse, coalitions due to its ability to increase the total amount of payoffs to be shared, as well as its desire to establish its dominant status by creating and widening the national consensus. Thus, it

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is able to gain the image of a party standing above partisanship and narrow, sectarian calculations. The dominant party attempts to perpetuate its superiority by emphasizing its readiness to include some ideological rivals in the cabinet. This readiness proves the party's strength beyond its formal proportional share of parliamentary seats.

Nachmias' arguments are theoretically important and their significance could be strengthened if other dominant party systems were studied from this interesting perspective. His arguments are important because they enable the abandonment of superficial explanations which emphasize the uniqueness of the Israeli political system, such as the permanent state of external war, or the impact of the pre-state period on the formation of large coalitions. The theoretical relationships between patterns of coalition formation and types of party systems have to be studied when there is a change in the type of party system; in other words, a change in the type of party system will be accompanied by changes in patterns of coalition formation. These changes can be analyzed as parts of an adaptation process to the new type of party system. The process accelerates after the party, which was once dominant, is unable to form a winning coalition and becomes an opposition party. This is the institutional indication of the loss of dominance and can appear some time after it actually occurs, rather than at the time of the loss. The aim of this paper is to analyze the nature of the adaptation process along ten years. As the loss of dominance becomes institutionalized, the coalition theories, which were unable to explain patterns of coalition formation as long as a dominant party system existed, can now describe, explain and predict the Israeli case.

The Party System

Duverger claims that a dominant party can exist in a two-party or a multi-party system;(5) his argument is well integrated in Sartori's claim that there is no relation between the existence of a dominant party and the type of party system: "the notion of dominant party established neither a class nor a type of party system."(6) Sartori created a complex typology of party systems in which he could not categorize the Israeli party system"; the fact remains that Israel hardly belongs to any type...Israel is very definitely a case by itself to be understood

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as such."(7) This is a sort of argument which resembles the traditional arguments about the uniqueness of coalition formation in Israel. Finally, Sartori decided to regard the Israeli party system as a moderate pluralism, although two of the main characteristics of this type are absent in Israel: a bi-polar coalition; and an opposition which is not bilateral. But the most important contribution of Sartori's intensive discussion is his conclusion that the term "dominant party system," used by Nachmias, is wrong. Blondel's distinction between a multi-party system with a dominant party and a multi-party system without a dominant party is worth using, but still needs further clarification.(8)

A multi-party system with a dominant party exists when the three conditions specified below are satisfied:

a) *In the general social context:* one party has a clear ideological superiority over its political rivals; the majority of the citizens identifies this party with an era of critical historical developments in which national challenges, such as independence, were successfully met. This component of dominance is emphasized by Duverger.(9)

b) *In the inter-party context:* one party (or list) gains, in three consecutive elections, a margin of more than 10% of the parliamentary seats over the second strongest party. This operational definition was adopted by Sartori when dealing with the term of "dominant party."(10)

c) *In the intra-oppositional context:* none of the opposition parties gains at least two-thirds of the total parliamentary seats obtained by all opposition parties. This was used by Punnet as an operational definition of the term "a dominant party in opposition."(11)

The importance of the term lies in perceiving the possibility of governmental change when the largest opposition party shows that it has a clear alternative potential to the ruling party. As far as dominance exists, the opposition is characterized by a bilateral structure, diversity and incapacity to design alternative policies and leadership to the ruling party.

An analysis of these three components of dominance reveals that the dominance was already lost during the 1973 elections. The seed of loss of ideological superiority of the dominant party was sown during the period of the Six-Day War; it developed when Gahal went back to the opposition benches in summer 1970, and reached its climax during the Yom Kippur

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War (1973) that functioned as a trigger event for ending this process of demolishing the dominance. The ruling party failed, for the first time, in 1973, to attain a 10% margin of parliamentary seats over the second strongest party, and for the first time an opposition party – the Likud – obtained more then two-thirds of the opposition searts. In 1973 Israel went from a multi-party system with a dominant party, to a multi-party system without a dominant party.

The change at the governmental level may be attained only after dominance has disappeared. Arian used a static system of propositions and thus was unable to distinguish between the two processes and was led, after the 1977 elections, to the Ninth Knesset, to a mistaken argument: "the Alignment lost because its dominance ended, and its dominance ended because it lost."(12) If the process of loss of dominance is neglected, the "turning point" remains unseen, and governmental change is the only tool, in this case one that is vary late in time, to recognize the absence of dominance. The distinction between the two processes is important to the analysis of coalitional patterns, since governmental change accelerates the process of adaptation of coalitional patterns to the change which occurred in the type of the party system.

Patterns of Coalition Formation (1974-1983)

Twelve coalitional situations can be identified during the years 1974-83. The first coalition after the 1973 election, headed by G. Meir (Alignment), was not a minimal winning coalition; it consisted of 68 Knesset members including an "unnecessary party" for winning, the Independent Liberals with 4 seats, the National Religious Party (N.R.P.) with 10 seats and the Alignment with 54 seats. A month after the coalition was formed, Meir resigned, and after several months of inter-party negotiations, a new coalition was formed, headed by Y. Rabin. This was a minimal winning coalition consisting of 61 Knesset members belonging to three parties: The Alignment, the Independent Liberals and the Civil Rights Movement (three seats). The coalition survived for several months until the Civil Rights Movement left, and the NRP joined. The new coalition was the same as the one which had been formed after the elections – 68 Knesset members from three parties. It collapsed at the end of 1976, when Rabin decided to oust the NRP out of

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his government, which went on as a minority government until new elections were held in May 1977.

For the first time the Alignment was sent into the opposition camp. The coalition headed by M. Begin (Likud) consisted of three parties: Likud (45 seats), NRP (12 seats), and Agudat Yisrael (an orthodox-religious party holding 4 seats). It was a minimal winning coalition supported by 61 Knesset members. Half a year later the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) joined the coalition which was enlargened to 76 Knesset members. But this latter, flash-in-the-pan party, went from crisis to crisis, split time and again, and its contribution to the coalition was weakened. Several members of the Likud left the coalition and this together with DMC's shrinking support changed in February 1980 the status of the coalition back again to that of a minimal winning coalition, supported by 64 Knesset members. When the process of collapse in the DMC intensified and when other Likud members left their party, the coalition lost its parliamentary majority in October 1980 and another situation of a minority government emerged. The elections were held in May 1981, six months before the regular elections day.

Following the 1981 elections to the Tenth Knesset, a new minimal winning coalition was formed with the support of 61 Knesset members of four parties: Likud (48 seats), NRP (6 seats), Agudat Yisrael (4 seats), and Tami (3 seats). The coalition lost its majority seven months after its formation as one of the NRP members left the coalition towards the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai. In May 1982 two Likud members joined the Alignment and deepened the minority situation which the government found itself. Even the return of the NRP member back to the ranks of the coalition was in vain. One month after the outbreak of the Lebanese War, Telem, a two member center party, joined the coalition which was now supported by 61 members and was thus a minimal winning coalition. Some weeks later, in July 1982, still during the war, Tehiya, a hawkish extreme party, joined the coalition which was enlarged thus to 64 members. After a few years of minimal winning coalitions and minority governments a situation of an oversized coalition reappeared. This time the deviation may be explained in terms of an external crisis, or emergency period, overwhelming other factors which tend to be crucial in normal times.

Five of the twelve coalition situations during the 1974-83

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period were minimal winning, rather than the traditional pattern of oversized coalitions that had existed until 1973. In all of these five situations a clear trend towards minimal range coalition can be identified. That means that they were ideologically cohesive. These coalitions were also characterized by the fact that they consisted of parties from two political camps, rather than by the inclusion of parties from the three traditional political camps, as had been the case until 1973. This may be one indication of the tendency towards minimal range coalitions. Three of the twelve coalition situations were minority governments. Those were ideologically very cohesive. Only four of the twelve situations were oversized coalitions.

In contrast to the previous clear disproportionality in payoff apportionments, from 1974 onwards a new pattern of payoff apportionments developed in which the disproportionality is smaller. Until 1973, the dominant party took advantage of the disproportionality, but after that, the lesser parties, not the largest one, begin to exploit the now smaller disproportionality.

For example, the NRP received, during the last coalition of the dominance period, two ministerial posts for its contribution of 12 Knesset members, and three posts for 10, just after the loss of dominance during the Rabin coalition of 1974. The represention index, taking into account the ratio of Knesset members to ministers, was 0.17 in the case of the NRP, until 1973, and increased almost twofold in 1977, to 0.33. In Rabin's minimal winning coalition without the NRP, the Alignment had a value of 0.29, the Civil Rights Movement 0.33 and the Independent Liberals 0.50. This finding is an example to the pattern found by Felsenthal, that in small coalitions the small parties are overpaid and the large ones underpaid.(13)

In the coalition formed after the 1977 elections, a strict allocation principle was determined: one ministerial post for four parliamentary seats. Agudat Yisrael (AY) refused to accept a Ministry, declaring its reluctance to be included in the collective cabinet responsibility. In fact this was also a result of the complex internal structure of the party. AY is a typical factional party, in which each faction reflects a totally unique way of life, beyond the political level, and who are to some extent hostile to each other. The ideological leadership of the Orthodox sector stands above the politicians and is organized in a special institution called the Council of Torah Sages. The rabbis, members of the Council, cannot share one potential payoff such

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as a ministerial post. The solution for AY took the form of four parliamentary posts, such as committee chairmanships, one for each AY member of Knesset.

Another indication of disproportionality was DMC's share in the cabinet. At first the share was four ministers to 15 Knesset members; then, three to seven; three to six, and finally two to three. It is also worth noting that for the first time, the Ministry of Education and Culture was not left in the hands of the largest party, but in 1977 was granted to the NRP.

In the coalition formed after the 1981 elections, the principle of a fixed key was kept, this time a ministerial post for three Knesset members contributed. The size of the smallest partner – TAMI – determined the key. AY continued with its strategy of giving parliamentary support to the government but staying out of the cabinet. This time it also received the prominent position of the coalition management chairman which in the past, was always in the hands of the largest party. The disproportionality finds expression in the way the ministries were distributed and also in the number of ministerial posts. The NRP lost half of its electoral strength in 1981, but did not lose any of its ministerial payoffs. TAMI received two ministries – Absorption; and Labor and Welfare – for a contribution of three Knesset members, while the Likud received 13 ministries for 48 members. A clear tendency is discernible in which the smaller the size of the partner, the larger its share in ministries. The Likud received a ministry for every 3.7 members; the NRP one for every three; and TAMI one for 1.5 members. Taking into account the fact that two of the ministries given to the junior partners are actually combinations of four previous ministries (the Ministry of Interior includes the Ministry of Police since 1977 and is in the hands of the NRP; TAMI's Ministry of Labor and Welfare also consists of two traditional ministries), then the disproportionality increases even more. Another change that occurred since 1973 can be found in the allocation of ideological payoffs. The largest partner does not have total control over the ideological payoffs. Small parties, such as the NRP and AY gain much more, ideologically, than the relative size of their contribution to the coalition. This change is connected to the differences in the type of bargaining process.

The bargaining process in a multi-party system with a dominant party is different from that in a multi-party system with-

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out a dominant party. The largest party was faced with this new reality already when forming the first coalition after the 1973 elections. The potential partners attempted to determine which parties should join the coalition. The NRP demanded to include the Likud and exclude the Civil Rights Movement. The latter did not want the religious parties in the coalition. The Alignment at first preferred the NRP (March 1974), then the Civil Rights Movement (June 1974) and finally returned once more to the NRP. Even then, two of the latter's members refused for some time to support the coalition. The Alignment was then faced with another basic change in the type of demands made by the NRP during the bargaining process, namely, a commitment by the government not to withdraw from the occupied territories of Judea and Samaria unless the issue was decided by a national referendum.

In contrast to the bargaining process in a multi-party system with a dominant party in which the latter negotiated with each partner separately, the 1977 bargaining process was characterized by some cooperation between the religious parties, and by the fact that part of the negotiations were held at a joint forum of all potential partners.

In 1981 the NRP tried once more to influence the decisions regarding which parties should be included in the coalition, by proposing the inclusion of the Alignment (which failed just as the idea of including the Likud in the 1974 Alignment government had failed) and the exclusion of TAMI. Finally the NRP realized that the Likud would be unable to form a winning coalition without TAMI and agreed to include the latter, but succeeded in preventing TAMI from receiving the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The NRP also influenced the bargaining process by setting a vast number (120) of demands, and requesting a thorough discussion of each. The NRP, AY and TAMI were negotiating simultaneously with the Likud and with the Alignment and were very successful in designing the bargaining process and in determining the rules of the game.

It is also important to consider the change regarding which party holds the vetoing power in the bargaining process. A dominant party always has a veto power. This was the situation with the Alignment until 1973, and even afterwards, despite its loss of dominance. However, in 1977 no party held the veto power, i.e. its participation essential to any coalition. In 1981 a new holder of veto power emerged: the NRP, despite serious

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losses in parliamentary seats, became an essential part of any possible coalition. This resulted from the refusal of the two largest parties to cooperate and from the exclusion of two parties – the communist Hadash and the extreme hawkish Tehiya – from any proposed coalition. To use Lijphart's term, both parties lacked "coalition potential."(14) Hadash is in fact an Arab party, while Tehiya's preconditions for joining any coalition were unacceptable to both major parties since their essence was the annulment of the Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty with Egypt. The Civil Rights Movement and Shinuy (Change) refused to cooperate with the Likud, which was therefore unable to form a coalition without NRP, AY and TAMI. The Alignment could have formed a coalition only by including the NRP, and in such case any one of the other parties could have stayed in the opposition. After the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, its most crucial contribution for achieving peace with Egypt, Tehiya started to hold coalition potential which later led her to join the coalition during the Lebanese War in summer 1982.

Until 1981 no small party had held this strategic position of veto power. In a multi-party system with a dominant party this position can be held only by the dominant party, while in a multi-party system without a dominant party, it is possible a) that no party holds this position (1977-81); b) that it is not held by the largest party; and c) that veto power is held by more than one party (a possibility not yet experienced by the Israeli political system). Pre-election pacts (another useful term of Lijphart) were crucial elements in the bargaining process of 1981. In the relatively new pattern of the Israeli political system, these pacts were not formally signed, and were more a type of commitment of a small party to a large party. The Civil Rights Movement and Shinny declared that they would join an Alignment based coalition, while the NRP and TAMI gave the same commitment to the Likud. In fact, TAMI was the first to adopt such a strategy in order to draw electoral support from among Begin supporters, the majority of which were of Oriental origin and TAMI was clearly emphasizing the Oriental ethnic issue. TAMI is a splinter group of the NRP and therefore the latter was afraid of being identified with the Alignment and decided to adopt the same strategy as TAMI. AY, based on a fixed electorate, preferred not to commit itself in advance. Telem, headed by Moshe Dayan, was the only party, with a

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coalition potential, which was totally independent of pre-election commitments. A dominant party is too strong to need pre-election pacts. This might however, characterize coalition formation in a multi-party system without a dominant party, and not a multi-party system with a dominant party.

Conclusions

The following trends were revealed after the change in the type of the party system:

a) A tendency towards minimal winning coalitions, although in some cases oversized coalitions still exist.

b) A slight trend towards minority governments. In none of these situations did the greatest party attempt to form a minority government which would endure for a long time. These three situations existed when parties or Knesset members left the coalition. A situation of a minority government has not yet been legitimized and has been perceived as a deviant and a temporary one.

c) The minimal coalitions, same as the minority governments are also minimal range coalitions.

d) More proportionality in payoff apportionments, the smaller parties having a slight preference – even ideologically – at the expense of the largest partner.

d) The bargaining process becomes more complex, with negotiations held both among the small partners and between them and the larger partners. The larger parties are unable to determine the rules of the game by themselves, and they are now designed by most partners, even by the smallest.

Dodd found that minimal winning coalitions are more durable than oversized coalitions.(15) This trend has not yet emerged in the Israeli political system. All five minimal coalitions (1974, 1977, 1980, 1981 and 1982), endured only a few months or weeks, in contrast to oversized coalitions which lasted longer. This might be explained by lack of experience and difficulties of adaptation to the new conditions created since 1974. It may be hypothesized that the pattern of minimal coalitions that emerged with the 1973 elections will gain legitimacy and will be institutionalized.

Groenning's two arguments regarding the durability of coalitions can be examined in the Israeli context.(16) The first, that the larger the number of partners a coalition is based on, the

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shorter its durability, can be immediately rejected. The minimal coalitions in Israel had no more than three or four partners (only that of July 1982 had five partners), less than oversized coalitions in the dominance period. The second argument states that durable coalitions are those in which the numerical contributions of the partners to the coalitions are similar, or at least tend to be similar. In fact, the oversized coalitions in Israel were more equally built than the minimal winning coalitions and following theoretical argument had more durability. Nevertheless, what seems much more convincing is that coalitions led by a dominant party endure more than other coalitions. A dominant party chooses one possibility among various coalitional alternatives, thus having meaningful sanctions towards its partners. These privileges are not held by a party which is not dominant.

Another clue for understanding the changing patterns of coalition formation in different party systems lies in Dodd's theoretical argumentation. Oversized coalitions are formed in unstable, highly fractionalized and polarized party systems. Minimal winning coalitions are formed in stable, not highly fractionalized party systems, no matter what the degree of polarization. Minority governments are formed in unstable, highly fractionalized and polarized party systems. Instability and a high degree of fractionalization lead to a lack of information to the participants in the coalition formation processes, while high polarization decreases the *a priori* willingness to bargain. But Dodd did not take into account situations where high fractionalization and stability, or low fractionalization and instability are able to neutralize the counter effects of the amount of information. In such cases the degree of polarization will be crucial to the understanding of different sizes of coalitions.

In the period of dominance in Israel, high fractionalization and electoral stability neutralized each other and high polarization became the crucial predictor of coalition size. The passing of dominance was accompanied by a decrease in fractionalization and even more, in electoral stability. Once more, these two factors neutralize each other while the strong increase in polarization determines the decrease in coalitions size.

Lijphart's most recent research on coalition size suggests an explanation of different coalition sizes according to the social structure of societies.(17) In non-plural societies there is a

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tendency towards minimal winning coalitions; in semi-plural societies towards minority governments; in plural societies the tendency is towards oversized coalitions. Ten out of twenty states studied by Lijphart deviate from this pattern. Israel is described as a plural society which experienced oversized coalitions and thus fits the theoretical argument. But what was true until 1973 is not so at present, and it would be an oversimplification to argue that the transition to minimal coalitions is due to a change in the plural nature of the society. An attempt to explain the numerous deviant states in the Lijphart model by using the type of party system as an intervening variable, while taking into account situations of change in type of party systems, might lead to a better understanding of this challenging topic. Even if only a few deviant cases can be solved, it seems worth doing; a theoretical breakthrough in this field will require the study of as many cases as possible and a great deal of insight.

FOOTNOTES

(1) For a discussion of the central coalition theories, see: Singh, M.P.: "Models of Coalition Behaviour," *Indian Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 38, no. 2, April-June 1977, pp. 166-178.

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

CHALLENGE AND CHANGE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

By Dr. Donald J. Senese

The author is a former Associate Professor of history who has taught the history of China, Japan and Korea. A traveller and writer on Asian events, he is a member of the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, University Professor for Academic Order, the American Council for Free Asia, the Japan-America Society and the Conservative Historians' Forum. His book MODERNIZING THE CHINESE DRAGON received a book recognition award from the Freedoms Foundation, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.

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ARMENIAN TERRORISTS AND THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

By Z. Michael Szaz

Recently, the activities of Armenian terrorist groups were highlighted by the exploding suitcase at Orly airport, killing eight prospective passengeers, mostly Frenchmen, and by the subsequent suicide assault on the residence of the Turkish ambassador in Lisbon. A Turkish diplomat was gunned down the day before the Orly bombing in Brussels. Later bombings of French diplomatic property in Teheran and West Berlin constituted "revenge" for the French arrests of the perpetrators of the Orly bombing.

The geographic scope of Armenian terrorism (which has included in the past, Australia, Canada, the United States and independent Communist Yugoslavia in addition to Western Europe), the lives claimed and the material damage caused, led Undersecretary of Defense Fred W. Ikle to state last spring before a Senate Committee that the Armenian terrorist groups are the deadliest, yet least studied, of all international terrorist groups. Although information about the groups, especially the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, are available in detail only to law enforcement agencies, careful research of unclassified United States and European sources and published ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) materials reveals a fairly accurate picture of the composition, aims and methods of these groups.

First, distinction must be made between three groups, each of which claims credit for the killing of the 28 Turkish diplomats and their family members, for the bombing of Turkish property which took the lives of many innocent passengers and bystanders both at the Ankara and Orly airports, and also other smaller bombings in Western Europe.

The atrocities committed by officials of the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians while deporting them from eastern Anatolia in 1915 are purported to be the direct cause for the

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emergence of these three groups, i.e., the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Armenian Revolutionary Army (a splinter group of ASALA), and the Justice Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide. It must be noted, however, that there is little historical continuity to link these events. Between the end of World War I and 1975, there was only one instance of Armenian terrorist activity, the assassination of two Turkish diplomats in Los Angeles by a survivor of the 1915 deportations, who was sentenced by American courts and is now living in a nursing home under guard. During the period of 51 years, no other attempts were made until now to avenge the atrocities committed during the First World War.

The results of the First World War radically changed the distribution of Armenians over the world, increasing the numbers living under Russian rule. Almost 70 per cent of all Armenians reside now in the Soviet Union, 3.2 million in the Armenian S.S.S.R., and about one million in other parts of the Soviet Union. The areas in Anatolia which had a sizeable Armenian minority, are today inhabited almost exclusively by Turks. The entire Armenian community in Turkey, centered mostly on the Istambul region, numbers about 60,000. The largest Armenian community in the diaspora lives in the United States, about 600,000, mostly in California (where even the governor is an Armenian-American) and the Greater Boston area. France became the home of about 300,000 Armenians (Marseilles area). About 150,000 Armenians stayed in the Lebanon following the deportations.

The prosperous Armenian community in the United States lobbies, in conjunction with the American Greeks, to try to keep the memory of the 1915 genocide alive and to help pressure Turkey to recognize it. The community, which is conservative on economic and political issues, nevertheless maintains cultural ties with Soviet Armenians. Despite the presence of an atheistic, Communist regime in Soviet Armenia, with concomitant violation of human and civil rights and sharp restrictions on the exercise of religious rights, the American Armenian community seldom criticizes these violations in their publications. Rather, Soviet Armenia is widely regarded as an imperfect, but the only existing, structure for the preservation of Armenian culture. This dichotomy of conservative American-Armenian feeling – anti-Soviet, yet grateful to the Soviet Union

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for preserving at least a semi-autonomous Armenian cultural and political entity – prevails, despite the unquestionable patriotism of the community towards the United States.

In order to research the beginnings of Armenian terrorism, we must return to the Armenian community in the Lebanon at the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975.

Another event, unrelated to the Armenians, is seen important to the emergence of the ASALA, the first of the terrorist groups. This was the attempt of the Greek colonels through their agents to oust Archbishop Makarios as President of the Republic of Cyprus and to affect its merger with Greece in the summer of 1974. Their grave miscalculation resulted in the fall of their military regime in Athens and to Turkish occupation of 36 per cent of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey invoked the right to intervention, awarded to it under the 1960 Zurich Agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus, despite the non-participation of Great Britain, the other guarantor power. The subsequent deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey, and especially between the government of the Republic of Cyprus (now restricted to the south of the island), and Turkey, resulted in successful lobbying efforts by American Greeks in the U.S. Congress to cut off military aid to Turkey between 1975-78. As a result, there was Greek Cypriote moral, if not material, support to the fledgling ASALA as John Reeves wrote in the *Review of the News* in 1980.

The godfather of ASALA was, however, not a Greek Cypriote, but Dr. George Habash, the chairman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the most radical and pro-Soviet member of the PLO. Habash could provide the would-be terrorists with a territorial base in West Beirut, also with some equipment and training. More importantly, he could serve as the ASALA contact in Moscow. Ostracized within the PLO in 1975, Habash was interested in new allies, particularly outside of the PLO.

The PFLP's support enabled the terrorists to organize assassination teams to kill Turkish diplomats and to approach the U.S.S.R. for material help in cash and arms. As the Soviet Union was already supplying arms to leftist guerillas in Turkey, using the ASALA to help destabilize Turkey presented no difficulties.

Thus in 1975 the ASALA was formed in West Beirut follow-

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ing the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war which enabled the PLO, and even the PFLP, to exercise semi-sovereignty in West Beirut and to protect ASALA. ASALA then made its first approaches to Lebanese Armenian youth concerned about the lack of an Armenian "national liberation" movement patterned on the role model of the PLO.

Ideologicaly guidance for the ASALA was also derived from Dr. Habash. In reality strongly Marxist, but publicly claiming "nationalist" values, the new ASALA leadership began to consider itself part of the world revolutionary movement against the imperialist powers. In their April 1979 press interview in West Beirut, reprinted in the *Armenian Observer,* ASALA spokesmen reiterated the usual slogans against America while praising the Soviet Union for having provided a homeland for the Armenians. They also called for the detachment of six Turkish provinces from Turkey and their reattachment to the Armenian S.S.R. Of course, they also stated that by killing Turkish diplomats (about 15 at that date) and by bombing Turkish property they would force the Turkish government to admit to the genocide of the Armenians in 1915.

An interesting insight into ASALA mentality may be gained from the article "What Does America Mean To Us?" in the February 1981 issue of *Armenia,* the official publication of ASALA. They explained their renewed activity in the United States as follows:

> The reasons for the progressive activity within the Armenian community in the U.S. are quite similar to general reasons...Throughout the diaspora, however, other factors – special to the U.S. – exist, imperialism in general has been under attack throughout the world by national and class struggles. The Armenian people, as part of the world masses, has become aware of their past exploitation and are reacting in defense of their national rights...The Armenian struggle is part of the world revolution, and, therefore, as the world revolution strengthens, so does the Armenian struggle. The Armenian youth, like all American youth, were raised on the outrageous lies of the invincibility and purity of the U.S. regime. Not only has this invincibility and purity concept fallen flat, but the ability to weaken the U.S. regime by organized mass struggle has enlightened the Armenian youth and shown

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them the correct approach to their national self-determination.

The article singles out the Communist, Bob Avakian, as a "U.S.-born Armenian and leader of worker-based resistance to U.S. internal exploitation," and continues:

> Even more important than such individuals is the organization of progressive groups. Despite the increasing underground activity of the ASALA in the U.S., there evolved groups who work openly in the community. The most important of these is *Azad May* (Canada), and a group of politically educated revolutionary people. In Los Angeles, there was also the short-lived Armenian Revolutionary Movement. All over the United States, as in the rest of the diaspora, the Armenian people are organizing. The ASALA, already well-established in the U.S., calls our half-million comrades to arms.

The ASALA used young Armenians from the Lebanon as its assassins and bombers in the United States. Sent to the United States as immigrants in the late 1970s, they were responsible for all the killings and bombings in America between 1980 and 1982. Their methods of raising money and intimidating Armenian-American and Armenian-Canadian business people, threatening to kidnap and kill their children and wives in case of noncompliance and betrayal, proved fairly effective. In 1982, however, one wealthy Armenian businessman in Canada dared the terrorists and reported them to the Royal Mounted Police. Thus, he provided the first clues leading to the arrest of the blackmailers and the information American law enforcement agencies used to foil ASALA attempts to smuggle a suitcase laden with explosives on a Canadian airliner at Los Angeles.

Upon its establishment in West Beirut, ASALA members fanned out to France and other Western European countries and later to the U.S. Its anti-American, pro-Communist stance conflicted with the views of the Armenian youth in these countries, although open criticism of ASALA in the community remained rare.

The conventional Armenian political parties were, however, worried about the influence of the ASALA. They were not interested in joining death squad activities; but there were radical youth in the Dashnag Party who felt differently. They organized the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

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(also in Beirut) and while Dr. Habash was the godfather of ASALA, these elements sought contact with the Phalange. This group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, was formed to provide a right-wing alternative for young Armenian extremists who would not want to submit to Marxist-Leninist party discipline. The Justice Commandos are the illegal offshoot of the youth section of the Dashnag Party which has vigorously denounced ASALA. The Dashnag Party played an important role in the short-lived Republic of Armenia (1918-1921). The party adheres to democratic socialist ideas.

The Justice Commandos are ideologically a mixture of socialism and nationalism, like the offshoot of the leftist Peronistas in Argentina, the Montoneros. The Justice Commandos are based mostly in English-speaking countries, although they retain ties to the Lebanon and to the Lebanese Phalange.

Recently, a third group has been claiming responsibility for assassinations — the Armenian Revolutionary Army. It is believed to be a splinter group of the ASALA with good connections to the Soviet Union.

Both the ASALA and the Justice Commandos are directed from the Middle East. ASALA and its offshoot, the Armenian Revolutionary Army, are completely dependent upon Syria and the Soviets who provide them safe haven, arms and cash.

The aims of the ASALA are parallel to those of the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. conceives of Turkey, which has 26 divisions, as the greatest obstacle to its drive toward a warm sea port and the Arab world. Destabilizing Turkey and blackening its international image are objectives of high priority to the Soviets. By playing up the memory of genocide, Armenian terrorists are trying to create an evil image for the Republic of Turkey. It matters little to them that whatever was done in 1915 was accomplished by the Ottoman Empire and not the present Turkish government. The ASALA demands the return of the "Armenian lands" — which are essentially the same provinces coveted by Marshall Stalin in 1945 — from Turkey. Stalin's pressure was only foiled by President Truman's resolute stand in favor of Turkey. These lands were mixed Armenian-Turkish even before 1915, and only a few thousand Armenians, but millions of Turks, live there today. Thus, the Soviet quest for the control of the strategic Lake Van region and the southern approaches to Batum in Transcaucasia coin-

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cides with the Armenian call for a "homeland" in Turkey which would then be attached to Soviet Armenia.

The parallel objective, almost identical ideology, and Communist-type terrorist methods, are incontrovertible evidence of ASALA-Soviet contacts even though the Soviet Union, for external political reasons, does not permit the ASALA to operate from Soviet territory in its assassination attempts against Turkish diplomats.

Soviet involvement in ASALA and ARA activities is becoming increasingly evident to the Armenian communities of the diaspora. Yet denunciations of the terrorists remain restricted to their methods rather than their objectives. Age-old Armenian anger at the Ottoman Empire expresses the hatred of a people toward their former masters who had belonged to a different race and religion and who had committed atrocities against them.

However, using a terrorist campaign to force the Turkish Republic to admit to the atrocities, or even to the genocide theory in killing Armenians, is illogical. The Armenians allege the killing of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915-16, while no responsible historians in the 1920s and 1930s ever spoke of more than 600,000, a figure which the Turks even dispute. The terrorist campaigns and the strident demands of the Armenian communities in the West that Turkey admit to the genocide of 1.5 million Armenian lives (while keeping silent about Turkish losses at the hands of the Armenian guerillas) is no way to promote a reconciliation between the two communities. Will not the killing of Turkish diplomats and their families only further deter the Turkish Government from any reinterpretation of the events of 1915-1916?

Armenian terrorists will have to be closely observed by U.S. and Western law enforcement agencies because ASALA and Justice Commandos have infiltrated Western countries in the guise of immigrants. In 1982 the terrorists have killed two Turkish diplomats in the United States and since 1980 ASALA has been bombing Turkish private and diplomatic properties.

The numerical strength of the terrorist groups is small, and during the past year 34 of them have been arrested in North America and Europe. With France joining the other law enforcement agencies of the West in tracking down Armenian terrorists ASALA and the Justice Commandos will have increasing

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difficulty in perpetrating their slayings. Estimates of ASALA strength range between 500 and 800. No estimates have been given for the Justice Commandos, but certainly their strength does not exceed that of the ASALA and ARA.

It is forecast that ASALA and ARA will attempt increasingly desperate bombing and assassination attacks and as a result more and more of their operatives will be captured or killed. If this forecast should prove correct, they should disappear in three or four years as a major international terrorists force. If they keep a low profile, they will lose face with their members. The question is: how many Turkish diplomats and their families, and how many innocent bystanders must die before the ASALA and Justice Commandos structure is sufficiently decimated, despite increased help from the KGB and Dr. Habash?

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FAILING SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE

By Edwin G. West

Americans are becoming increasingly disturbed by widespread reports of the declining quality of their public (government) schools. In 1974 the schools were given an A or B rating by only 48 percent of the sample of the public that was interviewed by the Gallup Poll; in 1982 the ratio had declined to 37 percent. By 1980 most people knew that S.A.T. scores had been falling for about two decades. In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence revealed that about 13 percent of all 17-year-olds, and perhaps 40 percent of minority youth were functionally illiterate. Nearly 40 percent of today's 17-year-olds cannot draw inferences from written material and only a third can solve a math problem requiring several steps. The Commission reported a poor average quality of teaching; a widespread switching from academic studies into "general track" courses; only one year of math and one year of science required for a high school diploma in 70 percent of the states, and the absence of a foreign language requirement for a high school diploma throughout the states. The Commission concluded: "The tendency of succeeding generations to improve educationally over their predecessors appears to be at an end."(1)

Can we ever hope for governments that are liberal, in the original meaning of that term, to put their schools in order? Some new analyses conclude that the structure of any majority voting democratic government is inherently monopolistic.(2) If we accept this finding, then to expect governments to be "liberal" is to expect a monopoly to be liberal, which seems a contradiction in terms.

While it is difficult, therefore, to apply the term "liberal" to governments, we may proceed to attach it to selected indivuals. In her prize-winning essay for the Mont Pelerin Society, Karen Vaughn has made the interesting distinction between the economic political entrepreneur and the ideological political entrepreneur. Unlike the former, the ideological entrepreneur in

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politics has an awareness of a grand design and takes advantage of numerous small opportunities to bring about the larger end desired. This view has a respectable ancestry for it goes back to Adam Smith's distinction between the politician, who Smith describes as an "insidious and crafty animal", and the noble or scientific legislator whose deliberations, in Smith's words, "ought to be governed by general principles which are always the same".

There are, however, many ideologies and all in competition with each other. The free market ideologist, according to Karen Vaughn, has to combine plausible arguments with correct models and good ideas with good packaging. "And being in the right place at the right time is as much an asset to the ideologi-entrepreneur as it is to his economic counterpart."(3)

In the context of education in 1983, it is tempting to argue that such political leaders as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher classify as ideological entrepreneurs for they certainly seem to be "in the right place at the right time". I shall argue, however, that while this may be true of their influence on other aspects of the economy, in the case of education it is much more debateable.

Meanwhile, if selected politicians are occasionally inspired by the liberal vision, so, of course, are many ordinary people. I would be more at home indeed writing an essay on the subject of "The Practical Problems of Liberal Individuals", with the assumption being that their main difficulties are hindrances of modern governments. This would take us, no doubt, to a discussion of the ultimate possibilities of a new constitutional convention, a convention that would, in effect, attempt to control, or put in their place, all day-to-day governments.

Whatever the approach taken, it is useful to start with facts. Both the ideological entrepreneur and the ordinary liberal will first be interested to know of recent experience throughout the world with endeavours to develop a more decentralized or market type system of education. I shall start by presenting some new evidence from world-wide sources and then proceed, first to offer qualifications to the data, and second, to select one or two case studies for further discussion.

To date there exists no adequate theory to explain systematically why private schools flourish in some nations and not in others. Indeed, it is only in the last twelve months that some

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international empirical overview of private education has been attempted.(4) Table I presents the first compilation from UNESCO data that has just been undertaken by Bruce S. Cooper and Denis P. Doyle.

A casual glance at the figures would appear to dispel the popular view that private education features early stages of development only to be superseded by growing public systems as national incomes improve. Consider the unweighted average estimates (from Table I) of elementary pupils attending private schools in each continent. In Africa it is 12.1 percent while in Europe, where incomes are higher, it is almost the same at 12.2 percent. The average for Asia is 13.3 percent. A less crude estimate, of course, would weight each nation by its population and income. This can easily be done and I await such an operation with interest. (The unweighted averages for North/Central America, Oceana, and South America meanwhile, are 14.2 percent and 17.6 percent and 14.5 percent respectively.)

The evidence of Table I obviously calls for imaginative hypotheses that might account for the differences between nations. Fortunately, one explanation for some of the differences has been obtained from official sources. When they consulted Eastern Bloc countries, Cuba, the Peoples Republic of China, and the USSR, the compilers of the table were informed with disarming candour that private education in those countries was "ideologically inconsistent with the mission of the State", and was therefore banned.

Beyond this the issues are more complex. One plausible explanation is that the ratio of private to public schooling is an inverse function of the size and growth of the public bureaucracy. Such an hypothesis might be inspired by Mancur Olson's *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1982) in which all aspects of a nation's economy are postulated to decline through slow strangulation by pressure groups who organize private monopolies after pressing the state into giving them special privileges. The novelty of Olson's theory is that recovery can only come about after some general social catastrophy which destroys the interest groups in its wake.

In the case of education, a good example of this process might be that of Chile where, since the downfall of the Allende regime, important barriers to private education have been

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dramatically removed. A law has been passed requiring prompt monthly payments of subsidies to approved private schools. The subsidies were valued originally at 50 percent of public school costs per person but this ratio has since been raised to 100 percent. In Santiago alone the number of applications to start new schools in the early 1980s amounted to several hundreds. The number of students enrolled in subsidized private schools (subvencionados) grew by nearly one-third between 1976 and 1980. This increase was ten times greater than the growth in the total student population over the same period.

Olson's hypothesis has of course been criticized on the grounds that it is ad hoc and depends for support on selected examples. Looking through the European list of countries in Table I we can identify instances that seem to be in the opposite direction to Olson's type of proposition. The country that has the highest proportion of private school students in this list is The Netherlands, a country in which there has been no recent major social catastrophy.

The evolution of the Dutch system of assisted private schooling dates from the 1920 law on education which enabled small groups of parents to start their own school by requiring the government to provide almost all the initial capital costs as well as current expenses. Provided a minimum number of parents assembled in a formal organization such as a "foundation" or an "association", the municipality had to provide them with a building, while the central government was obliged to pay teacher salaries. As a guarantee of serious intent the group of parents had to post a bond equal to 10 percent of the cost of the school building returnable to them if the building remained fully occupied after twenty years.(5)

Most of the actual entrepreneurship for starting up the schools came from church leader representatives of parents. As a consequence the private primary sector in Holland is now about 95 percent church-related.

It is no secret that pressure to legislate the 1920 Act came from politically organized church groups that consisted of substantial voting minorities. And it is these circumstances that have given rise to another theory that attempts to explain the success of private schooling generally. It postulates simply that private education is a function of cultural, religious and linguistic heterogeneity (James, op. cit., 1982). To be per-

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suasive, however, this hypothesis should test evidence of several other countries that also feature cultural heterogeneity, otherwise we are left with a single ad hoc empirical *verification* rather than a test of *falsification*.

The point is strengthened when we again look for opposite examples. In the nineteenth century, Great Britain had a considerable degree of cultural and religious heterogeneity. Nevertheless it emerged with a predominantly public system of education that is provided largely by a combination of local and central government effort.

More important is the question whether the Dutch system can be regarded as meeting the genuine definition of 'private schooling'. It is not sufficiently recognized how much central government regulation has accumulated in the Dutch system over the last few years. Indeed, if the average person were given the description of a school system that was financed by a central government which fixed teacher salaries, credential requirements, hours of work, together with the school curriculum, and made each separate school legally unable to fire its employees for incompetence or to charge fees for tuition, the same person would surely jump to the conclusion that this was anything but a private system. Yet, indeed, these same features describe the Dutch system of so-called 'private schools' in the 1980s.

The normal connotation of the word 'private' focuses on the individual origin and control of assets. When combined in a series of voluntary contracts with other inputs such as labour, the same assets are employed to provide services to customers at some positive fee. In the case of the so-called 'private' schools in Holland, such fees, as we have shown, are not allowed and the major school assets do not originate in private hands but are government provided. The only private contribution, as explained, is the privately posted bond equal to 10 percent of the school buildings costs, returnable if the building remains fully occupied for twenty years.

In effect the Dutch arrangement appears to be a public system that is managed through implicit contracts with decentralized interest groups that are rewarded with a small degree of educational influence and decision-making in return for their efforts (partly in delivering votes). The so-called private institutions in Holland appear to be very similar to what are known as

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'the controlled schools' in Britain's public system. In these British establishments denominational religious instruction may take place but the church is tightly controlled on other aspects of education and can appoint not more than one-third of the managers or governors. The same controlled schools are nominally regarded in Britain, however, as a component of the public system. (6)

It should be emphasized that about a third of the population of primary school children in Holland go to public schools. The bureaucracy administering them have seen to it that they have not suffered from the competition of the larger private sector. One measure to secure this has been the specific restrictions imposed by the government preventing private schools from charging fees for education. Similarly private schools are not able to attract better teachers by paying them higher wages, since salary scales are determined by the central government. (7)

It seems, therefore, that the Dutch system has gradually come under the "stranglehold" of dominant bureaucracies in alliance with teacher interests and, as such, the story seems very similar to the experience of other Western countries. Ultimately, therefore, the example of Holland does not refute Olson's type of hypothesis contained in this theory of the rise and decline of systems.

England provides another instance of the stifling influence of a mature bureaucracy in alliance with unionized supply interests. Britain has had over six years of public debate whether to allow one county, the County of Kent, to undertake an experiment with a voucher system. The obstacles put in its way so far illustrate a classic case of defensive strategy by the monopolistic alliance. First, the county was kept waiting for a long time for approval from the central ministry of education, and it had to wait two and a half years after the Conservatives came to office in 1979. (8) Second, doubt has been raised by the education establishment as to whether the voucher, as a means of payment for state schools, is legal. A third obstacle has been the threat of a teachers' strike.

Within the last year or so it is true that the voucher has been mentioned in speeches by several British Cabinet Ministers, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his Chief Aid, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury. But when it comes to

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the department with most influence on these matters, the Department of Education, the story is somewhat different. In December 1981, the new Secretary of State for Education, Sir Keith Joseph, wrote a letter in response to two education organizations that were concerned with parental choice. In it he announced:

> "I am intellectually attracted to the idea of education vouchers as a means of eventually extending parental choice and influence...
>
> "I therefore welcome your interest in exploring the difficulties...to see whether the scheme can be developed..."

The use of the phrase "intellectually attracted" was already foreboding.

Sir Keith's letter was accompanied by a long note from his administrators inviting its readers to come up with solutions to the many difficulties anticipated. In the note the bureaucrats explained "It is for the proponents of education vouchers...to describe how they would operate, how the practical difficulties would be tackled and what changes in the present arrangements would be involved." It was as if the administrators were the employers of the public and were insisting that the latter do their job of creative legislative reform.

The bureaucrats' note was worded in a way that clearly demonstrated that they were hostile in advance to anything that would change their existing system. This attitude was conveyed especially in their last two questions: "Would a voucher system be compatible with individual local education authorities' management of the education service in their areas? How would it fit in relation to an LEA's responsibilities to determine general policies in response to demographic change in respect of the pattern of schooling...?"

The presumption of these questions was that any negative answer would disqualify the voucher system immediately. But of course a voucher system would *not* be compatible with the existing management of the education service by local education authorities. Under a voucher system the management would fall increasingly into the hands of the consumers, a shift of power that would be intolerable to the existing producer dominated establishment.

Up to this point, many would have classified Sir Keith Joseph as an ideological entrepreneur, to use Karen Vaughn's

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phrase once more. If this description is still accurate, one can only say that he appears to have been captured by his own bureaucracy.

In the meantime the question whether Margaret Thatcher has any greater vision and influence in these matters, remains in serious doubt. Responding to a question on vouchers in a newspaper interview before the election of last year, she simply observed: "This is a direction we will go legislatively in the coming years...I would like to do an experiment in education vouchers."(9) After all these years of debate this was not too encouraging. Immediately after the election Mrs. Thatcher changed her tune. She rejected vouchers because of the "severe administrative problems" expected.

Whether Ronald Reagan is better described as an ideological entrepreneur in education is also not so clear. During the 1980 campaign he focussed on the appropriateness of federal aid to education and acted thereafter to reduce the federal expenditure on it. There has also been some success in combining several of the major programs into block grants with one grant going to the states and another going to local districts. Reagan has also proposed tax credits for parents who send their children to private schools. Meanwhile he continues to propose the the abolition of the Cabinet-level Department of Education which was created in President Carter's administration.

Despite all the proposals, the actual achievements to date have been modest. The federal funding for major elementary and secondary education programs has been reduced by only 13 percent, the Department of Education has not been abolished, and the program for tax credits failed to press the Senate in late '83. Meanwhile the democratic gains in the 1982 November elections have given new hope to the education establishment. In any case, it is not clear how much influence a president can have in the United States, where educational issues are the responsibility of states and not of Washington.

With respect to Reagan's educational tax credit, the proposal appeared to be very modest. The ceiling on the credit was to be a mere $100 in 1983 and only $500 by 1985. Surprisingly the credit was not refundable; that is if a family owed no income taxes, it would not be qualified to receive funds.
This was in contrast with the proposal by Senators Packwood

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and Moynihan whose refundable tax credit would reach the poorest families. A comparison of the two tax credit schemes is provided in Table II.

One of the most important potential barriers to the liberalization of education in the U.S. is the judiciary. The Supreme Court's reasoning in the famous *Nyquist Case* in 1973 was that vouchers as well as tax exemptions for schooling constituted "state aid". And under the First Amendment the state is not allowed to provide aid to parochial schools in any significant way.

It is true that the *Nyquist Case* concerned a situation to enable *particular* parochial schools to survive. Others would accordingly argue that a *universal* voucher scheme for all parents, whether in public schools or private, would have no primary effect of aiding religion.

If should be remembered, however, that there are two clauses in the First Amendment, one forbidding the establishment of religion and the second forbidding Congress to do anything that would *prohibit* religion. In deciding whether to send his child to a church school at a positive price, the parent has to realize that if he does so he has to forgo the opportunity of a free schooling in the public system. In economics the "forgoing of an opportunity" is the very essence of cost. But since the situation confronts the denominational parent with such a cost, the effect is to prohibit religion, at least in degree, and this is unconstitutional. But this logic has no spokesman yet in court.

Another practical difficulty facing proposers of tax credits or vouchers is the need to investigate the financial consequences and to present them in a way that is understandable to the public. Much of the failure of the local tax credit plan attempted in the District of Columbia in 1981 was attributable to public confusion over the financial outcome. As an example, consider the statement by Caroline Smith, the Director of the D.C. Department of Finance and Revenue. She argued that the total potential drain from the city treasury would have been $152 million. Closer investigation shows that this top estimate was based on the assumption that all public students switched into the private sector and took advantage of the full tax credit of $1200 each.

The misleading feature of Smith's argument was that, al-

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though it is true that the potential loss to the city treasury would have been in the region she estimated, yet the need for government expenditure in education would have been entirely removed if that same potential had been reached. Since there is presumably no point in financing a public system of entirely empty schools, the complete closing down of the system would have resulted in an enormous public saving. I have estimated, indeed, that there would have been a net *gain* to the federal and D.C. governments combined of just over $160 million, just the opposite conclusion to that of the director of the D.C. Department of Finance and Revenue.

The public, it seems, were not sufficiently reminded of the fact that when a student leaves the D.C. public system he or she would have saved the authorities in 1981 an annual expenditure of about $4000. At the cost of a tax credit of $1200 this would have been a clear gain of $2800. (Certainly the incumbent private school population would have received a windfall gain; but this could well have been offset by the savings from those who would switch from public to private). The purpose of the opponents in concentrating entirely on the loss of revenue and in ignoring the fact that there would have been a reduction in expenditure obligation, was to present the issue in terms of an all-or-nothing assault on the public system.

The curious thing is that the Washington, D.C. area was crying out for the kind of improvement that the tax credit promised. In 1980 the quality of local public schooling in the Washington area was lower than average. It had a student absentee rate, for instance, of 16.2 percent which was more than double the national rate. About one-half of Washington's 21,000 first through third graders failed to master enough basic reading or math skills to be promoted to the second half of the curriculum. D.C. ranks thirteenth among the sixty largest local public school systems in America and 38 percent of the school district's education budget is allocated for administration. With such a large and bureaucratized system one would have expected a big potential for parental alienation and general discontent.

Despite all these inefficiencies, however, the D.C. public system managed to encourage steadfast loyalty under the threat of the introduction of the tax credit.

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mobilize the D.C. government and do all we can to defeat this ill-conceived proposal."(10)

As another instance of this same trend, school superintendent Floretta D. McKenzie, publically urged defeat of the tax credit proposal because, in her opinion, it amounted to "a vote of confidence" in herself and in public school children. One of her subsequent actions was to put out a slanted "fact sheet" describing the tax credit scheme from the official viewpoint. It is reported that these sheets were given to public school pupils to take home to their parents. The fact that this avenue was open to the opponents but closed to the tax credit supporters was surely a serious handicap to the latter.

Any objective supporter of the principles of democracy will surely express grave concern about the practices just described. A situation wherein the supply interests of employees in a government-run service can obtain disproportionate political power is surely fraught with serious consequences. The developments are, in a sense, a *redistricting* that gives the majority of government workers an unfair influence in public policy matters. Not that these developments were absent even before the D.C. tax credit event. The scope of bargaining in teacher negotiation, for instance, had been expanding steadily over the previous period. Class size, student discipline, and curricula reform are three subjects with major policy implications that had already found their way into the teacher bargaining process.(11)

All these observations are disturbing since they present a picture of an over powerful, large, unimaginative, and grossly inefficient educational system. In economic terms the problem can be diagnosed as one of entrenched monopoly. James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock have asked the crucial question "why do we not also observe more efforts on the part of consumer-organized 'cooperatives' to control monopoly firmly through ordinary market purchase or acquisition?" In education, this avenue appears, however, to be closed. The reason is that the educational monopoly is one of *first degree*; that is it is one in which the citizen has little consumer surplus left with which to bargain.

To many liberals there will seem only one ray of hope left, at least in non-totalitarian societies. This is the hope that more and more families will migrate to a fully private system despite

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The educational tax credit advocates faced unusually adverse circumstances. First, the local press was united in its opposition. *The Washington Post* for example, ran a series of highly critical articles and editorials in the weeks leading up to the ballot. The regional media, of course, reflected the liberal flavour of the intellectual leadership of the area. And since liberals associate tuition tax credits with Reaganite economics, their reaction was almost predictable.

What was not quite so foreseeable was the strength of the organization of the opposition. It was to be expected that the American Federation of Teachers would, as before, come out against any tax credit proposal. But in its support this time it had behind it 31 local educational, religious, labour, and civil rights groups and 43 national organizations.

One of the chief arguments of this coalition, and one that apparently was used with significant effect, was that the tax credit scheme was being organized by outsiders who had come to Washington to destroy its public school system. It is true that the D.C. Committee for Improved Education, the organization that pioneered the tax credit scheme, was a local offshoot of the national taxpayers union. It is true, too, that these supporters contributed $114,000 for the referendum campaign. At the same time, however, the opposing coalition received even more help from outside the area. Of these the nationally based AFT and the AFL-CIO, for instance, planned to spend $200,000 in fighting the tax credit measure.

Meanwhile The Reverend Ernest Gibson, Chairman of the D.C. Coalition against Tuition Tax Credits, announced a planned expediture by his group of $50,000 in a two and a half week campaign that would include advertising, phone, banks and a mass rally.

One of the most disturbing features of the whole episode was the unabashed participation in the political process by the government departments, departments that are supposed to be the servants of the political process and not activists in it. Even more serious is the way in which the same departments used public funds in their organized opposition. D.C. Mayor Marion Barry announced openly that the top administrators had been instructed to have their supervisors pass out information sheets prepared by tax credit opponents and urged their employees "to come to vote 'no'". "We make no bones about it, we will

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the costs involved. A dramatic example of this occurred in Alberta in 1977 when leaders of the Mennonite sect announced that 300 children would be withdrawn from public schools in four areas, so tripling the number already attending their own private religious schools in three districts. One of the main motives was what the leaders described as the deterioration of secular public education. Resistance against the Mennonites was predictably conducted by the public school organizations and the Alberta Teachers Associations. For one public school district, the loss of 120 out of 305 local pupils meant a sudden, sharp decline in provincial grants and the teachers association faced the loss of six teaching jobs. This action amounted to nearly 40 percent local parental desertion of the public schools. If even this proportion was to become widespread, it could automatically cut tax obligations significantly and strengthen the trend.

It is interesting that over the last few years, in a period of generally declining enrollment, private schooling in the U.S. has been doing relatively better than the public schools. Between 1970 to 1980, for instance, public school K-12 enrollments decreased by 10.7 percent compared with a 4.9 percent decrease in private enrollments. Between 1981 and 1990 it is predicted that private enrollments will increase by 8 percent compared with an expected 2.7 percent increase in public school enrollments.(12)

The reported figures, however, probably cover only established, accredited schools. Families who choose unaccredited schools probably do not want state approval nor do they want to be counted by the census bureau. It is a matter of faith with some schools to reject state authority and to refuse information on themselves.

Bruce Cooper and Donald McLaughlin have used techniques specially designed to locate the more obscure schools in a sample of twenty-two counties. They have estimated that there are 15,000 non-Catholic private schools in the U.S., serving two million children. They also estimate that enrollments in these schools are increasing at a rate of 100,000 per year.(13) This is in striking contrast to the steady decline in enrollments in public schools.

The private system, of course, has done better in some geographical regions than in others. We can thus focus on the

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private/public enrollment differential across states and to look for explanatory differences in a systematic way. At the moment I am undertaking some multivariate analyses to test a series of hypotheses concerning the differential success rates. Preliminary results support the fairly obvious prediction that private school populations are higher in regions with larger numbers of Catholics and in regions where the public system has the highest pupil/teacher ratios. My findings also suggest, however, that families are transfering to private schools in larger metropolitan areas where problems of crime and discipline in schools are notoriously concentrated. More interesting still is that I am finding that private schools do better in areas where the incidence of union induced work stoppages in public schools is highest.

Many liberals will perceive this trend as the most promising because, if we have to rely on vouchers to stimulate the private sector of education there is always the danger of increased bureaucratic regulation so that ultimately private education will lose its central character. The Dutch system, as we have seen is one indication of such danger.

No very clear cut results one way or the other are predictable in the near future. We can expect indeed that the public system, if threatened enough, will improve its quality, at least marginally. Even the parental alienation and desertion from public schools that we have been witnessing recently in America, may have had some such stimulus. Over thirty states have recently adopted minimum competency tests for public school student performance and many local jurisdictions have done the same.(14) There is a new emphasis on basic skills in many schools and grade promotions are increasingly based on performance rather than age or attendance. Meanwhile certification procedures have been strengthened in many states (despite the protests of teacher unions) to ensure that teachers meet minimal educational levels. Finally, there is the evidence of a recent small upturn in scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores.

So we end where we began on the question of whether one should wait for a virtuous government or rely instead upon the natural judgements of ('liberal') individuals. More and more parents are becoming impatient with government promises, however 'liberal' the government professes to be. In this they would seem to be echoing the sentiment of Adam Smith's

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nineteenth century disciple, Sir Robert Lowe, who told the 1868 Schools Enquiry Commission in Britain that:

> "I myself see nothing for it but to make the parents of the children the ministers of education, and to do everything you can to give them the best information as to what is good education, and where their children can be well taught, and to leave it to work itself out."

And in the same year he wrote:

> "Parents have one great superiority over the Government or the administrators of [school] endowments. Their faults are mainly the corrigible faults of ignorance, not of apathy and prejudice. They have and feel the greatest interest in doing that which is for the real benefit of their children. They are the representatives of the present, the living and acting energy of a nation, which has ever owed its sure and onward progress rather to individual efforts than to public control and direction. They have the wish to arrive at a true conclusion, the data are before them, they must be the judges in the last resort, why should we shrink from making them judges at once?"

Here indeed *was* an ideological entrepreneur in politics.

FOOTNOTES

(1) For full references to the points reported in this paragraph see Edwin G. West "Are American Schools Working? Disturbing Cost and Quality Trends", *Policy Analysis,* CATO Institute, Washington, D.C. August 9, 1983.

(2) Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, *The Power to Tax,* CUP, 1982.

(3) Karen I. Vaughn, "Can Democratic Society Reform Itself: The Limits of Constructive Change" in *For a Free Society in a Coming Decade,* Mont Pelerin Society, 1982 General Meeting, Berlin.

(4) "Cross-National Comparison of Non-Public School Enrollment, 1982", Paper prepared for the American Education Research Association Annual Meeting, Montreal, Canada, April 13, 1983, and the International Encyclopaedia of Education (London: Pergamon Press) Forthcoming, 1984.

(5) Estelle James, "Pre-conditions, Benefits and Costs of Privatized Public Services: Lessons from the Dutch Educational System" PONPO Working Paper-47, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University, March 1982.

(6) Another instance of a public system run by denominational Groups is that of Newfoundland in Canada.

(7) James op. cit., p. 32.

(8) Arthur Seldon, "Around the World in 3750 Words in Search of Family Sovereignty in Education", Paper submitted to Centro Ricerche Economiche Applicate Roma, Italia, 1982.

(9) Quoted in Selfon, op. cit.

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(10) "Barry says vote for initiative means tax hike" by Lawrence Feinberg, *The Washington Post,* October 17, 1981.

(11) H.H. Wellington and R.K. Winter, *The Union and The Cities,* Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1974.

(12) *Projections of Education Statistics to 1990-1991,* National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, 1982, Table 6.

(13) Bruce S. Cooper and Donald H. McLaughlin, "The Latest Word on Private School Growth", Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Education Research Association, New York, March 1982.

(14) Denis P. Doyle and Terry W. Hartle, "The Federal Government and the Schools: Where do we go from Here?" *Journal of Contemporary Studies* Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1983.

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WHY MIDDLE CLASS STUDENTS AREN'T LEARNING

By Edward M. Levine

Since 1957, when Russia startled the West by becoming the first nation to send a guided missile, Sputnik I, into outer space, American education has become a subject of mounting public concern and controversy, although the focal issues have changed somewhat over the years. Shocked by this spectacular technological coup that suddenly, if momentarily, cost the United States its lead in an increasingly competitive race for supremacy in military technological development, this nation responded by lending unprecedented emphasis to improving its educational system. In a short period of time, academic excellence, higher education, and scientific research were vaulted into a position of new-found eminence.

The public schools soon became the focus of attention as a result of the contention by some that America's lag in military technological equipment was in some measure attributable to the educational inadequacies that could be traced to deficiencies in the curricula and teaching. "Why Johnny Can't Read" was a theme woven through many of the commentaries, studies, and reports that made their appearance during the early 1960s and beyond. Urgent calls were sounded for modernizing the public school curricula, the adoption of innovative teaching methods, and for the addition of more advanced and demanding courses in mathematics, the sciences, and even in the social sciences. Before long, the schools added numbers of such changes, although some of them, such as "new math," later prompted doubts and objections. C.P. Snow wrote provocatively about the communications gaps between the humanities and the sciences, thereby elevating the role of the former in higher education. And later, during the Vietnam War, the federal government awarded draft exempt status to male college students who maintained high grade point averages, thereby stimulating an interest in pursuing a college career among numbers of high school students who otherwise might have foregone an advanced education.

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Earlier, liberal spokesmen, Civil Rights organizations, social science researchers, and others pointedly expressed their concern that economically disadvantaged children, particularly black, inner-city youngsters (and, later, Hispanics) were ill-prepared to learn and were inadequately taught, attended schools with out-moded educational facilities in antiquated buildings, and frequently were badly lagging behind educational achievement norms even before they completed elementary school. They were also quick to note that disturbingly large numbers of such students dropped out of high school because they found learning extremely difficult and often vocationally meaningless because of the decreasing number of jobs requiring only modest skills.

In conjunction with a hospitable ideological climate resting on a legacy of nearly four decades of governmental programs to assist the needy, handicapped, and elderly, and prodded by the newly developed national interest in providing quality education, a profusion of studies and journalistic commentaries disseminating information about these latter concerns were instrumental in bringing about the enactment of a variety of governmental programs whose objectives were to provide new and better educational programs and services to public schools. A basic premise underlying the increasing governmental support for upgrading the educational process was that growing numbers of high school students would enroll in college. Therefore, it was considered imperative that secondary schools properly prepare them for higher education, itself ever more important to the economy and technological advancements.

Even as new educational emphases and courses were becoming established, the first faint sign of an emerging trend appeared, one that a decade hence would be regarded as an extremely disturbing one. This was the first drop in the national average verbal and mathematic Standard Aptitude Test (SAT) scores of high school seniors that was registered in 1963-64 (verbal, 478; mathematics, 502). These scores dropped sharply and steadily until 1980-81 when they levelled off for the first time (verbal, 424; mathematics, 466), and improved slightly in 1981-82 when verbal scores rose two points and mathematics scores rose one point, gains so slight that they can not be regarded as auguring an important and lasting reversal of this trend. The special significance of this trend is that it

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reflects the declining educational achievement of *middle* (and upper-middle) class high school students, the subject population of this analysis, and not chiefly that of working class and lower and low income students, as will be shown below. Furthermore, this trend occurred during the same span of years when there was an ever-increasing and substantial amount of government funding for a host of educational programs, services and research – none of which arrested this trend.

The Evidence and Its Implications

By the late 1970s, the declining national average SAT scores had become the subject of considerable concern and discussion by those regarding them as a reliable and worrisome sign of students' under-achievement. However, such views drew a sharp response from those who questioned the validity of the SAT examinations and, therefore, disputed the accuracy and significance that was ascribed to the SAT results.

For example, some claimed that the SAT examinations have been, if inadvertently, biased against non-white students, principally those from lower and low income families, arguing that the questions were "middle class" in character. Others reasoned that students who formerly would have dropped out of high school because of marginal or failing grades have increasingly remained in school to graduate, for it has become ever more evident to them that a high school diploma has become essential for gaining employment in other than unskilled and low-skilled jobs. Still others have challenged the validity of the SAT examinations, contending that its questions are largely unrelated to the materials that students are assigned to study and that they are, therefore, an unfair test of their knowledge. For these and other reasons, the skeptics and critics have concluded that SAT scores are invalid indices of student achievement levels that, they claim, are as sound as ever.

Such judgements and conclusions do not square with the evidence that is supported by studies of the SAT examinations and relevant demographic information. For example, the findings of such specialists as Christopher Jencks (1978) and David Wiley and Annagret Harnischfeger (1977) have shown that the examinations and what they measure are reliable instruments for ascertaining the educational achievement levels of

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high school seniors. Moreover, the decline in their scores has taken place across the social classes. Jencks (1978) found that while but two per cent of the population of Iowa and Minnesota was black, the SAT scores in these states had followed the general trend. Other evidence of the declining scores of middle class students is found in the decision of universities such as Harvard and Yale to lower admission scores. In 1965, they required SAT scores of 700 out of 800 on verbal and mathematic examinations; by 1975, their admission requirements had dropped to 650, even though they continue to attract students from more affluent social strata and higher achieving students. More recently, Barbara Lerner (1983) has persuasively shown how serious and widespread this trend has become.

Those entertaining marked reservations about or disputing SAT scores are often individuals who believe that social problems, in general, can be alleviated or resolved by enacting new or extending established governmental programs whose efficacy in achieving these goals is unquestioned by them. The advocacy of such approaches for dealing with the more pressing social problems rests on the conviction that their causes are essentially economic or social structural, and that their obstructing or damaging effects can be effectively diminished, if not overcome, through social policies that more equitably distribute income or provide remedial and facilitative services. Moreover, they are disinclined or rigidly unwilling to consider the possibility that the causes of some social problems, such as the declining educational achievement levels of middle class high school students, are due to motivational deficiencies and socio-cultural conditions that the most imaginative and amply funded governmental measures are utterly powerless to change for the better. As will be seen in much that follows, the erosion of fundamental cultural values and the lessened motivation to learn are chiefly responsible for the declining educational achievement levels of middle class high school students.

While the disagreements about the significance of the SAT scores remain, there is now greater agreement that the educational attainments of middle class high school students fall short of the levels they are capable of reaching. However, the socio-cultural causes of this problem are generally unrecognized, and few indeed have suggested that inadequately motivated students also contribute to it. Consequently, this downward

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trend seems all the more mystifying because middle class students have enjoyed many material advantages, enjoyed living in comfortable homes in pleasant communities, and attended schools with modern facilities and competent faculties. With such advantages their educational futures seemed assured. That their educational performance has been far below that of their predecessors of a decade and a half ago, and that they have motivational and behavioral problems that formerly were largely associated with students from economically disadvantaged families prompts the question, "What went wrong – why aren't they learning as well as they can?"

The Collapse of Cultural Standards

Many factors have been identified as being responsible for the falling achievement of middle class high school students. The elimination of dress codes, excessive television viewing, the deemphasis on basic academic courses, the proliferation of undemanding electives, the "pass/fail" grading system, incompetent and indifferent teachers, passive administrators, grade inflation, drug use, and court decisions upholding students' rights at the expense of standards of comportment and school authorities are frequently cited as the major causes of this phenomenon. While these and other factors have figured importantly in the deterioration of the educational process and in student under-achievement, they are more accurately understood as proximate causes stemming from more fundamental ones.

Basic changes that have occurred in family life as a result of affluence and the pervasive emphasis on the pursuit and fulfillment of individual interests, as well as the cultural trends favoring impulse-gratification, self-centeredness, and a present-orientation, are the root causes of these difficulties that have so weakened the ethos of educational institutions. These aspects of their lives have been instrumental in adolescents' assuming that material plentitude and considerable independence are permanent conditions of life and that, because of them, they are also entitled to the good things in life without putting forth much effort to earn or achieve them. The material abundance they have enjoyed has accustomed them to being self-indulgent, passive consumers. And it has done much to discourage their willingness to defer present for future gratifications, thereby

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diminishing the importance of self-discipline and self-commitment in school. Furthermore, many are prone to indulge their libidinal and aggressive impulses in the culture of Rock music and dances, to engage in sexual activity in their early adolescent years, and to relativize the already weakened religious and secular standards that stress impulse-regulation, a concern for the rights and prerogatives of others, and a future-orientation. They have grown up in an anomic cultural atmosphere in which little that they do is sanctioned, and much is tolerated or condoned, by parents and adults who are too confused, uncertain, or weak to insist that youngsters be responsible to themselves and others.

Because the conditions under which they have grown up have not induced them to be as industrious and productive in their school work as they could be, numbers of students are indifferent about applying themselves and fulfilling their talents, thus failing to reach the level of academic achievement that they would otherwise attain. Largely because of the material and emotional gratifications they have enjoyed and come to take for granted, they have developed the notion that they are entitled to good grades without having to strive for them. The sense of "entitlement," which Daniel Bell has insightfully discussed in another context, is now pervasive among middle class adolescents. Thus, diligence in classes and in preparing homework assignments is ever more regarded by them as an unreasonable imposition, rather than a legitimate attitude that is properly expected of them by their teachers.

Students' motivation to study, learn, and be well behaved in school has also suffered because of their parents' negligence or indifference in teaching them to be self-disciplined, interested in learning, and respectful of other students, their teachers, and the ethos and institution of education. In considerable measure, their attitudes and values are the result of sending children to day care centers and of both of their parents working; young people cannot be effectively socialized without their parents' consistent and ongoing involvement with them from childhood into and through adolescence. This holds with greater force for maternal parents during their children's pre-school years.

The Decline of Comportment Standards

Exacerbating the behavioral and educational problems besett-

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ing high schools is that numbers of parents have withdrawn their support from teachers, thereby undermining their ability to enforce appropriate standards for comportment, curricula, and grading free from arbitrary student (and, occasionally, parental) pressures. On the other hand, the actions of a few adults and those of government agencies and public interest law firms have initiated litigation that has successfully challenged the authority of school officials over student disciplinary issues and problems. Court decisions that have over-ridden their policy-making and enforcing powers have discouraged, perhaps intimidated, school authorities from upholding meaningful standards and from taking justifiable action in situations that legitimately call for disciplinary sanctions. To do so, in their judgement, might well trigger off new litigation in which they believe the odds weigh heavily against their chances of winning.(1)

The marked weakening of comportment standards has had a pronounced effect on student behavior. It is now a commonplace to note that students feel free to argue with, challenge, and ignore their teachers' requests and orders, and that their argumentative, insolent, and even belligerent and disruptive behavior make good teaching exceedingly difficult and, at times, impossible. As a result, teachers have lost much of their respect and authority, and find themselves obliged to devote time for teaching to maintaining order and dealing with provocative students.

Since students too easily and often ignore the rules of comportment with impunity, they are directly responsible for eroding the climate of respect for the educational process which is indispensable for motivating the faculty to teach well. An orderly, pleasant atmosphere is also essential for students if they are to be able to learn to the fullest of their abilities. And its impairment deprives those students who remain dedicated to learning of their educational rights, for they are penalized by those students whose troublesome ways have established a Gresham's law of social behavior in the schools. There is more than a touch of irony to this, for teenagers are generally adamant about being sufficiently mature and willing to assume responsibility for their social lives, yet numbers of them have proved to be disappointingly irresponsible in their attitudes and behavior while in school.

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The lax enforcement of behavioral standards in schools is pointed out by the now pervasive use of drugs in high schools. Yet not that long ago any student who was apprehended for selling, possessing, using, or being under the influence of drugs in or adjacent to a school would have been automatically suspended or expelled. At that time, parents almost instinctively supported the authority of teachers and administrators. Rather than rushing to their children's defense when they seriously misbehaved, they also meted out punishment, in this way reinforcing the legitimacy of school policies and the actions of teachers and school authorities. Today, however, drug use before, during, and after school is widespread and presently shows no signs of diminishing. Indeed, it is increasingly detected among students in the upper grades of elementary schools, as teachers, social workers, journalists, and researchers (Levine and Kozak, 1979) have found.

Paradoxically, most school authorities consider it futile to employ those measures that seem to have the greatest likelihood of decreasing student drug use, since both students and their parents are generally opposed to stringent sanctions. Thus, students, teachers, principals, superintendents, school boards, and parents have come to accept, or resign themselves to, the covert use of drugs in schools even though this is widely forbidden. While it borders on the inconceivable, drug use is now generally regarded by the public as an extremely regrettable fact of school life that they apparently envisage as a permanent condition unless students choose to abstain from using drugs (Levine, 1980). In this dereliction of responsibility, parents loom as weak authority figures for their children who understandably conclude that they have some latitude of choice in deciding whether or not to obey their schools' standards governing drug use and other aspects of student comportment.

Since most school authorities and parents are unwilling to enforce those policies that would discourage students from using drugs in schools, they have opted for drug education programs, thus sloughing off on educators their own responsibilities. However, these programs have yet to demonstrate their effectiveness; non-drug using students state that such programs are informative and of use to them, while drug-using students view them as undisguised attempts to frighten them into discontinuing using drugs. Because the latter believe that the dangers

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of drug use have been highly exaggerated in the material they read and by lecturers, they continue to use drugs.

There are some signs, it is true, of a concerted reaction against drug use in high schools. Four Chicago metropolitan area suburban high schools (three public and one parochial) have made serious efforts to stop or sharply curtail drug use by suspending students for their first offense, expelling them for the second one. Thus far, however, only one public school has succeeded in this endeavor. College freshmen who matriculated from the other three schools were of the opinion that these measures are ineffective and that nothing can be done to diminish drug use in high schools. Convinced that smoking marijuana is no more injurious than drinking alcoholic beverages (which is even more commonly done) and because they are confident that they will never be apprehended for possessing or using drugs since there are so many students in school, students themselves doubt that it is possible to reverse the rate of drug use in secondary schools. To the extent that their observations are accurate, this is grim news for the future of the educational process. It also attests to the limitations imposed on governmental officials who are charged with the task of curtailing drug use.(2)

Student drug use also contributes to the demoralization of teachers, thereby interfering with their desire to teach as well and enthusiastically as they can. As a result of the general attenuation of standards of comportment, schools have become small, anomic communities that less than ever uphold the critically important role of exemplifying in practice those values of fundamental importance for students' educational development and social maturation. Yet without the active support and cooperation of parents and the public, it is difficult to imagine that they will be able to reassume this traditional responsibility.

The Erosion of Academic Standards

The introduction of lenient grading standards has also caused students' learning to suffer. Teachers in middle class secondary schools are acutely aware that most of their students plan to attend college and are, therefore, anxiously concerned about receiving high grades in order to qualify for admission – especi-

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ally to the better institutions of higher education. Consequently, teachers have found it quite difficult to remain objective in grading their students. Moreover, to have resisted or ignored both the subtle and blatantly direct pressures for higher grades that are brought to bear on them by students, and, if less often, by their parents would have been to have invited difficulties and badgering that are beyond their powers to resolve agreeably. The result has been the inflation of grades which stands in stark contrast with the substantial drop in SAT scores that has unmasked this deception. Principled teachers who successfully resisted this trend sooner or later have found themselves caught up in it in order to avoid being singled out by students for criticism ("Why are you the only teacher who doesn't give me an 'A' or a 'B'?).

Paralleling and exacerbating this trend has been the addition of numerous elective courses to the curriculum. Some of them, of course, usefully supplement academic courses, others deal with practical interests, and still others provide meaningful educational opportunities to develop personal interests and talents. Too often, however, elective courses have proved to contain appreciably less substance and to make fewer and much easier demands on students' minds and abilities than do basic academic courses – the very reason that numbers of students have chosen to enroll in these courses.

Among the reasons for their addition to the curricula and students' propensity to register for these courses is their misguided notion that learning should generally be enjoyable. This emphasis works to students' detriment since it discourages them from putting forth their best efforts. After all, learning how to conjugate verbs and write grammatical sentences, struggling to solve difficult mathematical problems and understanding how to use logic in analysis, discussion, and writing involves work that is often laborious. Yet it is success in just such intellectual tasks that provides students with the satisfactions that they need and that good teaching and a sound curriculum can offer them.

To argue otherwise, as some still do, is to mislead students by failing to teach them that some aspects of learning, as with some aspects of most occupations, necessarily require attending to details, memorizing, and fulfilling routine duties. Indeed, laxity about learning may breed a similar attitude toward the

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execution of occupational responsibilities. Furthermore, to affirm the view that learning should almost always be enjoyable is to lend credence to the self-impairing and misguiding hedonistic cultural influences that young people find so alluring and gratifying. It also wrongly holds teachers almost solely responsible for students' declining motivation to learn and, thus, for their educational under-achievement, thereby ignoring the latter's responsibility for them.

Another limitation of the proliferation of elective courses is that they led students successfully to demand the replacement of the traditional system of letter-grading with the "pass/fail" standard. Their rationale for this change was the argument that they are placed under unreasonable pressure to achieve high grades in elective courses which, since they fall outside students' areas of concentration, handicap them from achieving respectable grades. However, since the grade "F" has essentially fallen into disuse in middle class secondary schools, and because the grade "D" has become widely regarded as the equivalent of failing, teachers are disinclined to assign a "fail" grade to students taking courses evaluated by the "pass/fail" system.

This approach to grading actually establishes a *dis*incentive to learn, especially for more able students, since individuals of varying levels of competence and achievement receive the same grade – "pass" – regardless of the caliber of their work. In this way, a lower common denominator has been adopted as the grading standard and it has the effect of discouraging students from using their minds and skills to the fullest. This is an instructive lesson in how the educational process has deteriorated as a consequence of school authorities yielding to students' determining the criteria to be used for evaluating their academic performance. Not only does the "pass/fail" system ignore and fail to reward important qualitative differences in students' achievements, it also imposes unjustifiable costs on those students who most respect, uphold, and whose efforts are encouraged by standards of excellence by undermining their motivation to learn (Levine 1981).

An Assessment

The degree to which students' learning has been hindered by faculty of modest talents can not be accurately determined,

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although such teachers have undoubtedly stifled numbers of students' enthusiasm for learning. However, educators of limited intellectual abilities and teaching skills have been found throughout the school system in previous generations, so there is no compelling reason to conclude that the trend of the past fifteen years is primarily attributable to their inadequacies.

As the ethos of high schools has worsened, teachers have become increasingly disillusioned with their careers, just as their aspirations for their students' educational growth has dwindled. Exasperated by having to demand compliance and civility from their students, overwhelmed by bureacratic paper work requirements that are often meaningless, and disheartened by the lack of understanding and support from parents and school officials, many teachers openly admit that they merely go through the motions of teaching. Numbers of them do only what is required for them, devoid of enthusiasm for their work; dissatisfaction is evident in their candid comments that they would take jobs in business, if only they could find those meeting their income needs, interests, and those for which they were qualified. Those who are close to educational circles find it not uncommon to meet or hear about teachers, characteristically those of high caliber and dedication, who chose to resign several years or more before the age of mandatory retirement because they were no longer willing to endure student indifference toward learning and their insolent attitudes.

The frequently heard charges about incompetent teaching are to some extent more properly ascribed to the loss of enthusiasm for teaching by more able and sensitive educators. Yet students (and parents) unreasonably and insistently expect and demand that teachers teach well regardless of the former's attitudes and behavior. Furthermore, students feel that they have even less reason to learn if their teachers do not motivate them to do so, thus completing the vicious circle that has developed. But students exhibit remarkably little awareness that self-motivation is crucial for their educational attainments.

Nor is the attitude of the public encouraging. Most people hold teachers immediately responsible for students' lack of motivation to learn and, thus, for their educational deficiencies. Pressed by ever-rising taxes from all quarters, parents and childless adults alike are adamant in demanding quality teaching for their school tax dollars, considering it to be the equivalent

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of an economic service. Few realize, however, that they bear the brunt of the responsibility for the erosion of the moral standards and the social order of the schools. And most are equally unaware that the downward trend in SAT scores occurred during the same period when huge budgets were allocated by local, state, and federal governments and by private foundations for an impressive variety of teacher training institutes and workshops, pedagogic conferences and seminars, the development of new courses, laboratory and other equipment, and for a host of research projects – all sharing the purpose of improving the educational process, yet none of which was able to curb this trend. It is not betraying criticism to note that the best that can be said for this monumental investment in such programs and services is that it may have helped stave off an even more precipitous decline in student achievement levels.

Should there be a growing concern about the parlous state of secondary education, as seems likely, forming commissions of distinguished educators and others to search for its causes and to submit proposals supplying corrective measures, to call for a massive upgrading of the quality of teaching, and to urge the undertaking of still more major research projects as the instruments for resolving this problem will be to advance misplaced emphases that will impose new and wasted costs on tax payers and divert attention from the crux of the problem.

Good teaching always has been – and always will be – of paramount importance, for it is central in enabling students to reach their educational potential. However, the public's tendency to focus on the quality of teaching has not been accompanied by a thoughtful concern about students' unwillingness to apply their minds as well as they can. Better teaching and the recruitment of well qualified teachers cannot help students learn or inspire them if the latter are disinterested in learning.

Nor is there a need to fund still more comprehensive studies searching for the causes of students' loss of motivation and their falling achievement scores. None will unearth explanations for these problems that are not presently well known to many individuals in the field of secondary education. It is futile to believe that wide-ranging research projects will identify and explain as yet unknown causes of these problems or offer solutions for them. Indeed, as James Q. Wilson has written, albeit in another context, social science explanations of the

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causes of social problems cannot serve as the basis for designing policies to resolve them when these causes are human values and attitudes.(3) And it is surely the case that the values and attitudes of students and their parents have eroded the moral climate of the schools and sapped students' commitment to learning, as well as having undermined the morale of educators.

It is imperative, therefore, that parents revive and renew their commitment to the values and standards that have long demonstrated their efficacy as the foundation of the educational process and its social order. These values are those of self-discipline, industriousness and perseverance, and a desire to learn; respect for other students' right to learn and the ambience in which they can do so, and for the authority and dignity of teachers and school officials; and the acceptance of sound standards for grading and organizing the curricula. Restoring the primacy of these values in the schools and instilling them in children, at home and in school, alone will revive students' commitment to learning and teachers' enthusiasm for teaching.

It may be even more important to recognize that these values are rooted in and drive their vitality and influence from families and their communities, not from educational bureacracies, school boards and administrators, and legislative bodies. Therefore, the prospects for arresting and reversing the educational trend that began in the mid-1960s depend on the willingness of parents in each school district to offer their full support to teachers and administrators in reinstituting these values and in enforcing their observance. Given the state of disarray into which secondary education has fallen, this surely ranks as one of the major challenges on the agenda of community concerns in this decade.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The detrimental effects of judicial decisions on the authority of school officials have been thoughtfully discussed by: Joseph Adelson, "What Happened to the Schools," *Commentary*, March 1981; and Edward Wynne, "What Are the Courts Doing to our Children?" *The Public Interest*, Summer 1981.

(2) The State of Illinois requires public high schools to provide their students with drug education programs that are usually incorporated in semester long "Health-

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Education" courses, and students generally enroll in these courses during their sophomore year. Five middle-class, suburban, public schools in the Chicago metropolitan area (Maine East, Buffalo Grove, Evanston, Waukegan, and New Trier) indicated that lenient penalties for drug use were the norm, with suspension being the common practice. They ranged from three days to ten days suspension and disciplinary action determined on an individual basis (New Trier), for the first offense, to ten-day suspension, and suspension and referral to the police and expulsion (Buffalo Grove). There was no indication from these schools that their efforts had been successful in deterring the sale, possession, or use of drugs by their students.

(3) James Q. Wilson, "Crime and the Criminologists," *Commentary*, July, 1974.

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POLITICAL WARFARE: THE DECISIVE STRATEGY

By Joseph Miranda*

1. The Supremacy of Political Warfare

The United States suffered its first lost war in Vietnam. It unilaterally withdrew its forces from Indochina. It cut off its military assistance to its allies in the Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. It did nothing to stop the Communist offensives in 1975 which conquered all of Southeast Asia. Yet all this happened after the United States had won an unbroken string of military victories. American ground forces never lost a major battle. American air forces had complete control of the skies. American naval forces were never challenged at sea. American military technology proved far superior to that of the Communist powers.

Yet, the United States was powerless to prevent a communist victory. Nor has America been alone in such a defeat. If one examines the conflicts since World War II – the Chinese Civil War, the French war in Indochina, the anti-colonial revolts in Algeria, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, the overthrow of the Shah, the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua – it can be observed that the armies with "superior" military power, that is, firepower, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, nuclear weapons and other "indicators" of military strength have not been victorious. Victory has instead gone to the various "National Liberation Fronts" and "People's Armies." What precisely is it that has allowed communist and Third World forces to defeat Western armies again and again? They have triumphed through their use of *political warfare*.

Political warfare has proven to be the decisive strategy in the post-World War II era. Unfortunately, it has been neglected by the American (and other Western) defense establishments in favor of nuclear and conventional forces. The West has payed

** The opinions, statements and policy suggestions in "Political Warfare: The Decisive Strategy" are those of the author an are not to be considered official, nor necessarily reflecting the view of the United States Army.*

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for this neglected by a series of defeats worldwide. Even now, America is on the defensive. Communist political warfare threatens its tactical nuclear forces in Europe and is spreading revolution throughout Central America. Unless the United States understands the nature of political warfare, and is prepared to employ it as a strategy, it will suffer more defeats as it did in Vietnam.

Political warfare affects the will. It encompasses the fields of organization, propaganda and resistance. These indoctrinate, change public opinion, demoralize the enemy, mobilize the people and create a new political order.

2. Political Warfare: The Theory

Political warfare, as developed by Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, is part of an integrated political-military-social campaign. Communist revolutionary warfare is fought through political operations. Political warfare outmaneuvers superior enemy armed forces. It does not directly confront the enemy military. Rather, it attacks the political system behind it. The destruction of the enemy's political system leads to the collapse of its military. The revolutionaries can then establish their new order. Communists fight to build a society based on Marxism-Leninism. Third World forces fight to build a society based on revolutionary nationalism, often mixed with Marxist ideology.

Underlying all operations is a political program. Mao Tse-tung says: (1)

> "...there must be a political program...without a precise, specific, political program we cannot mobilize the armed forces and all the people to resist...how to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and films, through schools, through mass organization and cadres."

The political program tells the people what they are fighting for. It gives objectives to the military arm of the revolutionaries.

Political operations take precedence over military. Communist revolutionary warfare is a protracted struggle to destroy the enemy's political, social and economic structures and replace them with communist institutions. (2) Political operations must sustain the will of the people to carry on the struggle. This struggle may last decades, as the wars in China and Indochina

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demonstrate. North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap attributed victory in the war against the French to the Communist Party's policies in uniting the Vietnamese people through propaganda and political organization. Further, the French were defeated through the destruction of their will to fight. (3)

The support of the people is critical in political warfare. Through this support, a political/revolutionary movement gains recruits, supplies and intelligence information. As the revolutionaries mobilize the people, the enemy's political basis is weakened. When a revolutionary force seizes an area, it does not seek only to establish military control. It instead alters the nature of society. Peasants are indoctrinated, land is redistributed, "exploiters" punished. Terror is selectively used to eliminate political enemies. If the revolutionaries must withdraw, they leave behind supporters to carry on the struggle.

Giap considered political work in the ranks of the armed forces important. He said: (4)

> "During the [anti-French] war, [political] work imbued the army with the policy of long-drawn-out resistance... Political work aims at strengthening combativeness, uniting patriotism with proletarian internationalism [i.e. communism]."

The military conducts "armed propaganda," a combination of terror and propaganda, to gain control over the populace. The purpose of military operations is the development and safeguarding of the political base of the revolution. (5)

Organizationally, the basis for political warfare is the *cadre*, a small group of personnel trained in revolutionary ideology and political action. The cadre moves among the people to form a political organization, which then mobilizes the people. The political organization may be called by a variety of names – "Communist Party," or "National Liberation Front." This organization controls all political and military operations. It mobilizers the people through subordinate organizations. These include political fronts, youth groups, cultural societies, guerilla armies, etc.

Political warfare is a means to strike the enemy's homeland and destroying his will to fight. Mao sates: (6)

> "...the world revolution can only succeede if the proletariat of the capitalist countries supports the struggle for liberation of the colonies..."

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Giap adds: (7)

> "Our foreign policy was directed to winning the support of the people throughout the world, and particularly to influence the French public opinion against the war."

This is especially critical in Western nations, where public opinion has a decisive effect on government policies. Democratic freedoms allow opposition groups to operate freely. Political warfare uses these opposition groups to mobilize public opinion against involvement in the war. Groups include Communist parties and their front organizations; Marxist and other left-wing groups which are sympathetic to the revolutionary cause; anti-war and pacifist groups, which while not in favor of the revolutionaries can be exploited to pressure the government to "end the war."

There are many techniques available to political warfare. *Agitprop* – "Agitation and Propaganda" – is the primary method of forming political organizations and mobilizing the people. Lenin defined "propaganda" in this context as the indoctrination of a select following with communist ideology. This select group are politically aware and will form the cadres of the Communist movement. (8) These cadres conduct propaganda to recruit additional members for the movement.

Agitation is the communication of a few ideas or slogans to the masses of the people in order to mobilize them. Agitation is limited to a few ideas to reach the widest possible audience. It uses issues which immediately concern the populace: land reform, government repression and corrpution, ending a war, whatever. The revolutionaries convince the people that only they can satisfy their needs. Of course, the revolutionaries are only temporarily using these issues to gain support. Once in power, they enact their own political program, which is usually against the interests of the people who supported them, such as collectivizing land instead of turning it over to the peasants. (9)

Agitprop media includes newspapers, leaflets, books, posters, pamphlets, graffiti, slogans, stickers, speeches, murals, films, radio, television. Agitprop can use a variety of other forms.

Mass rallies and demonstrations give the appearance of popular support for a political movement by involving thousands of people. They provide solidarity between members of the organization and supporters. Since demonstrations inevitably attract the news media, they reach every newspaper reader and television viewer.

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An agitprop method developed during the Vietnam War is the *teach-in*. This organizes a set of speakers, usually on a university campus, to ostensibly present all sides of an issue, such as American involvement in a war. It is rigged so that only the organizers' position is given any credible support.

Guerilla theater is street skits for propaganda. Originally, these were brief plays which had a political purpose. However, it also includes staged events which draw in unaware spectators. One popular stunt is for a radical to dress as a police officer and assault innocent demonstrators. Guerilla theater is effective because it involves people in the action.(10)

Agitprop can exploit any situation. Especially vulnerable are the Western news media, with its sensationalism and immediacy. Any incident, such as a demonstration, can be turned into a propaganda forum. Khomeini used the seizure of the American embassy to address the entire world as to the alleged evils of the Shah and the United States for supporting him. Soviet bloc leaders use interviews conducted by prestigious Western newsmen to reach into every American household.

The Communists use negotiations as a political weapon. As North Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Hinh said.(11)

> "In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions."

Negotiations are not used for their ostensible reasons, that is, to "end a war," "reduce tensions" or "disarmament." Negotiations are used to wear down the enemy's will by offering a false solution to a problem. Revolutionaries gain important concessions, such as being admitted to a coalition government. They also serve as a propaganda forum to address the enemy's homeland.

Civil disobedience is another propaganda weapon. It was developed independent of the communists, but it has been used by them. Civil disobedience is the deliberate violation of the law in order to bring about social change. This includes passive resistance, non-violent resistance and direct intervention.(12)

Passive resistance is the refusal to fulfill a social function, such as registering for the draft. It also includes economic noncooperation: boycotts, strikes and work slowdowns.

Non-violent resistance is group protests, propaganda, mock trials and "haunting" public officials (that is, continually harassing them).

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Direct intervention involves sit-ins, sitdown strikes and traffic slowdowns.

The advantage of civil disobedience is that it forces the government to become the aggressor. The authorities eventually have to call in the police to clear out the demonstrators. This gives the appearance of a repression of dissent. If the resisters have children with them, the arrests look like an attack on the innocent.

Revolutionaries fight to gain control of the streets through mob action. By controlling the streets, they can attack opposing forces – police and opposition political rallies. The revolutionaries gain the appearance (if not the reality) of control of a city by freely marching where they want.

Lenin adopted his doctrine for inciting riots from Louis Blanqui, a nineteenth century French revolutionary. Blanquism uses political cadres to manipulate otherwise peaceful assemblies into rioting. This was done through agitation and guerilla threater. The cadres would then direct the crowd into attacks on government forces.(13)

Terror is also a political weapon. Terror is not simply random acts of violence, but a controlled instrument. It attacks the enemy's political structure by killing or kidnapping government functionaries and supporters. Further, it demoralizes the rest of the populace and undermines their willingness to resist. However, terror is useful only under circumstances where the people are unable to fight back. Otherwise, it hardens resistance to the terrorists.

What gives political warfare such strength is its persistency. The communist and Third World propaganda machines take a few basic themes – revolution, national liberation, anti-imperialism – and hammer them home, year after year, decade after decade, in their literature, in mass demonstrations, in front of television cameras, at the United Nations. It becomes a kind of litany.

The fight is always by "the people," against the "oppressors," that repressive regime that controls 70 or 80 or 90 per cent of the land. There is always the parade of rallies, teach-ins, international proclamations, concerned organizations. The revolutionaries are never communists, of course, but simply "nationalists" or "agrarian reformers" or "democrats," and if only the United States would end its interference, the "people"

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will work things out for themselves.

The government under attack by the revolutionaries becomes demoralized. It finds its international support disappearing. It is pressured by the United States to end repressive measures and to negotiate with the rebels. Military assistance is cut off. Western forces are withdrawn. As the government collapses, the revolutionaries move in.

Of course, as soon as the revolutionaries take charge, they quickly establish a totalitarian government, oppress the people and systematically commit the same atrocities the old government was routinely lambasted for. But no one seems to notice, as the propaganda machine moves on to the next country to be assaulted...

This the pattern today in El Salvador, previously in Iran, Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Algeria, China, even going back to the Russian Civil War.

3. Political Warfare: The Practise – Vietnam

The American defeat in Vietnam was largely due to a communist political warfare offensive. This offensive involved four campaigns: protracted warfare, exploitation of the anti-war movement; exploitation of the media; the Paris Peace talks.

The North Vietnamese used a fairly simple propaganda line throughout the war. They presented themselves as nationalists defending their land against foreign imperialism.(14) This theme was repeated endlessly. It rallied support within Vietnam. It put the United States on the psychological defensive, since America had to overcome charges of "aggression."

The Communists understood the American national character, the desire for quick results in quantifiable terms. They protracted the conflict through guerilla warfare to take advantage of American impatience. United States' forces continually inflicted massive casualties on Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units. But the communists were always able to replace their losses, either from the North, or by recruiting through the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. Furthermore, they used their sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia to harass American forces and to refit shattered units.

The situation was made worse by the American military's insistence on making the communist armed forces their primary target, instead of the political structure of the National

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Liberation Front.(15) As a result, the Viet Cong could always maintain its hold on the populace.

Since revolutionary wars cannot be won overnight (it took the British over ten years to defeat the communists in Malaya), America's will to fight eroded as the war continued. Suport for the war dropped as America seemed to be in a no-win situation.

The anti-war movement used basic propaganda techniques to attack America's war effort. It took a few slogans and repeated them endlessly, at rallies, in the classrooms, on television, in the streets. These included: "the war is immoral and illegal," the Republic of Vietnam was "corrupt and repressive," the war itself was "unwinnable" and the Viet Cong were only "nationalists." Regardless of the truth of these claims, they became accepted as virtual dogma.

The anti-war movement used the full spectrum of political warfare against the American war effort. This included political organization, rallies and demonstrations, sit-ins, draft resistance and attacks on the ROTC and military research on the universities. Extreme elements in the movement used violence and terror in street riots and bombings. A massive propaganda barrage included posters, guerilla theater and North Vietnamese propaganda films.

The North Vietnamese coordinated their activities with the anti-war movement.(16) In May 1969 Mme Nguyen Thi Binh of the National Liberation Front met with leaders of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. This was followed in July by an "anti-war" leaders conference, which included representatives of the Communist Party USA, Young Socialist Alliance, Socialist Workers Party and the Student Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam. They planned the October 15th Moratorium and the November 15th March on Washington.

Louis Schnieder of the American Friends Service Committee and James Forest of the World Peace Council (a Communist front organization) went to Hanoi in December 1969 to arrange an international anti-war conference in Stockholm.(17) Their spring 1970 anti-war program included demands for American withdrawal from Vietnam, presentation of alleged U.S. war crimes and support for the Viet Cong. Five days after the conference ended, Communist forces launched their offensive in central Laos.

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The Communists used the anti-war movement as a weapon against the American strategic bombing of North Vietnam. They conducted two propaganda campaigns against the bombing, which coincided with the American bombing offensives, Operation Rolling Thunder in 1965-68, and the Linebacker Operations in 1972.(18) The Communists claimed that the bombings were an attempt to wipe out the civilian population of the North. They contacted anti-war personalities in the United States and Europe, took them on tours of the bomb damage and had the international media show the results to the world.

Bertrand Russell's "War Crimes" Tribunal, made up of various European and Asian intellectuals, went to North Vietnam to investigate. On May 10, 1967 it accused the United States of "...deliberate, systematic and large scale bombardment of civilian targets..."(19)

Jane Fonda visited North Vietnam in 1972 and made a series of radio broadcasts for the Communists in which she accused U.S. Air Force and Navy bomber crews of taking part in war crimes:(20)

> "I don't know what your officers tell you...those of you who load the bombs on the planes...The men who are ordering you to use these weapons are war criminals according to international law..."

"Stop the Bombing!" became one of the anti-war movement's main slogans. Whenever the North Vietnamese accused the United States of genocide, the anti-war movement predictably joined the chorus.

It did not make a difference that the United States bombing in both the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker operations took excessive precautions to avoid civilian casualties and limit unneccesary damage.(21) It did not make a difference that the total civilian death toll from both campaigns was less than 60,000.(22) (Or less than the 100,000+ civilians killed by the Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945, or the 83,000 killed in the firebombing of Tokyo in World War II.) And it did not make a difference that the Communists routinely fired artillery shells and rockets at civilian targets.

It was the United States that was put on the defensive. Its bomber crews were demoralized. Support for the war further eroded. Drastic limitations were placed on the bombing to pre-

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vent more civilian casualties. And in 1968 President Johnson unilaterally ended the bombing of the North.

The Communist exploitation of the Western news media has already been documented by Peter Braestrup(23) and Robert Elegant.(24) Briefly, reporting concentrated on American and South Vietnamese incompetence, official lies and atrocities. At the same time, the media tended to accept Communist claims at face value and ignored Communist atrocities.(25) The press ignored anything that did not fulfill its editorial needs. It hammered home the themes it wanted: bloodshed, action and exposé. Television showed all the bloody side of the conflict while ignoring the peaceful lulls and the constructive efforts America was making in Vietnam through its civic action programs. The instantaneous qualities of television gave the appearance of objectivity, even when incidents were fabricated by news teams.(26)

And since, for some peculiar reason, the Communists did not allow the press to freely roam through their zones, to film massacres the Viet Cong committed or investigate corruption in North Vietnam or publicize their own defeats, the media picture that emerged was that American policies were the cause of all the war's suffering.

Often the Western press published stories and photographes that had their origin in Communist sources, or consisted of pro-Communist propaganda. Harrison Salisbury, assistant managing editor of the *New York Times,* wrote a series of articles on the bombing of the North based on unverified North Vietnamese material. However, the *Times* printed it over his byline as if he were reporting from the scene.(27)

The Communists used the media during their 1968 Tet Offensive to give the appearance they were winning the war. It did not matter that the Viet Cong captured only one of their objectives – Hue – or that they were destroyed as a military force. What counted was the blood and rubble on the television screens. This made it seem to the American public that the Viet Cong were a well-nigh invincible force, that the United States was unable to defend South Vietnam and that American leaders were lying when they claimed the Communists were on the verge of defeat.

The Communists used the Paris Peace talks not to reach a peaceful conclusion to the war, but as a propaganda weapon.

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The Paris Peace talks opened another front, giving the Communists a propaganda platform to manipulate world opinion.

The Communists set forth specious demands for peace which included withdrawal of American forces, recognition of the Viet Cong and the resignation of President Thieu. If accepted, these would have meant the end of the Republic of Vietnam as an independent nation. But, by making the United States reject the demands, it appeared that America was holding back "peace." Once America accepted a negotiated solution, military victory was lost as an objective. The United States deluded itself into believing that the 1973 Paris Peace Accords would end the war. In reality, they only provided a cover for the Communists to build up their forces and launch their final offensive.

The United States did not conduct any sort of political warfare campaign during the war. It purposely did not launch a nationwide campaign to convince the American people of the war's justification, nor to sustain the national war effort.(28) It made no effort to counter the worldwide Communist propaganda effort against the war.

Even more incredible was that the United States allowed the opposition such a free hand. To allow delegates and advocates of the enemy to openly organize and undermine the war effort is suicidal. The same can be said about the media. The press understood the critical nature of its role during previous wars and submitted freely to censorship.(29)

America attempted to use military pressure against the Communists to force them to negotiate. But what was overlooked is that in a war of attrition what is destroyed is not enemy soldiers or weapons, but the will to fight. The Communists withstood all military losses because their propaganda campaign could maintain their will. Further, they recognized America's vulnerability in its lack of a cohesive political strategy and ruthlessly attacked it. In the end, it was the destruction of American will and not Communist forces that proved decisive. Supporters of the war became demoralized. The general beliefs were that the Republic of Vietnam was not worth defending, that the war could never be won, that the American government was deceiving the people and that the Communists were only the innocent victims of American power.

The United States eventually did what the Communists wanted: it withdrew its military forces from Indochina, cut off

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military assistance and refused to react when the North Vietnamese launched their 1975 offensive. Such an open act of Communist aggression, ten years earlier, would have led to unified Western retaliation. But after a decade of political warfare the morale of the United States collapsed and the South Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians were forces to capitulate.

The results of the Communist political warfare campaign were not limited to Indochina. Exploiting American paralysis, the Soviets (along with the Cubans) intervened openly in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan. American refused to back its long-time allies in Iran and Nicaragua in the face of anti-Western and Marxist revolutions. And the Panamanians pressed home their claim for the Panama Canal. Even now, the cry "No more Vietnam!" is raised whenever America considers intervention abroad.

4. Political Warfare: The Practise – Soviet Union

Soviet political warfare goals include:

1. The destruction of the Western will to resist.
2. Rendering NATO military strength powerless.
3. Creation of a Soviet dominated Marxist-Leninist world order.

Soviet doctrine and practise has always avoided direct military confrontation with the West. The Soviets know very well that a major war might lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union itself. Further, the Western powers are prepared to fight a major conventional or nuclear conflict. A military invasion would be immediately recognized as Soviet aggression, and would lead to a unified Western defense, as in Korea.

But, political warfare outmaneuvers the Western position. It does this in two ways. Political warfare does not directly confront NATO with an armed threat. Instead, it attacks its rear and flanks. These attacks include the Soviet support and control of revolutionary movements in the Third World and supporting anti-war movements in the NATO countries.

But, more importantly, the Western world does not recognize these political operations as attacks against it. Instead, they are seen in Western, democratic, terms as "free speech," "dissent," "negotiations," "getting both sides of the story." Revolutionary activity is viewed as the spontaneous actions of oppressed

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peoples. As a consequence, the Western world conceeds the Soviets an enormous advantage: it allows the Soviets to conduct a political war without responding.

The Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulates Soviet political warfare. The Politiburo directs and coordinates political operations with military, diplomatic and economic maneuvers. The Central Committee gives detailed guidance to the departments which implement the actual operations. These operations are executed by four organizations: the International Department of the Communist Party, the International Information Department of the Communist Party, the KGB and the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party. These operations are part of broad campaigns, often lasting several years, which involve all elements of the political warfare community.(30)

The International Department controls foreign political propaganda and political operations. These include Communist Parties, front organizations, friendship societies, clandestine broadcasting and revolutionary movements. There are 75 Communist Parties worldwide, not counting those under direct Soviet control. They have a total membership of eight million. They are an important political weapon. Each controls its own newspapers, mobilizes people for mass demonstrations, disseminates propaganda and forms front groups. They gain additional importance when their members are elected to positions within Western governments. The Communist Party USA receives its direction and funding from the Soviets.(31) The Soviets have instructed them in the last few years to emphasize arms control, disarmament and the peace movement. Specific campaigns it has been involved in include the opposition to the neutron bomb and NATO nuclear weapons modernization.(32)

Front organizations have taken an increased importance in recent years. Many people will not associate themselves with overt Communist organizations. Front organizations allow the Soviets to manipulate Western public opinion without revealing their role. Probably the most important front is the World Peace Council, which is active in 130 countries. It is directed through the Soviet Committee for the Defense of the Peace, and, ultimately, from the International Department. It follows Soviet policy slavishly, always attacking Western defense

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policies and ignoring Soviet aggression. Prior to 1979, World Peace Council activities in the United States were coordinated by the Communist Party USA. In 1979 the Communist Party organized the United States Peace Council as a World Peace Council affiliate. This increased propaganda activities, using conferences, publications and demonstrations.(33)

Some of the other main front organizations include the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, Generals for Peace and Disarmament, the Center for Defense Information, the Democratic Front against Repression and various El Salvador Solidarity Committees.(34)

The Soviets have used these fronts to directly intervene in the democratic political process. They have used the World Federation of Trade Unions to finance the campaigns of politicians who are friendly to Soviet policies.

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship ostensibly promotes "understanding" between the United States and the U.S.S.R. However, it supports Soviet political warfare in the United States. The Soviets have directed it to concentrate on disarmament issues and the peace movement. It has sponsored rallies and demonstrations in favor of disarmament. In April 1981, it advocated coalitions for the nuclear freeze.(35)

Soviet radio officially broadcasts over 2000 hours weekly in 82 languages.There is also "semi-official" broadcasting through stations such as Radio Peace and Progress. Through these broadcasts the Soviets reach millions of people worldwide.

The Soviets use revolutionary movements to expand their control. This happens in several ways. The Soviets directly or indirectly control these movements through their agents, supporters and advisors. As the revolution proceeds, the guerillas become dependent on the Soviets for weapons, supplies, funding and training. If the revolution succeeds, the Soviet Union provides economic assistance and protection against Western military intervention and counter-revolutions.

The International Information Department uses a Westernized reporting style to gain an audience in the non-Communist world. It does not use Marxist rhetoric which in the past has alienated Western audiences. Instead, it is sophisticated and urbane. The International Information Department controls Soviet news agencies such as TASS, Novosti, Pravda, Izvetiya

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and the Soviet embassy information departments. Soviet propaganda channeled through these sources is often accepted as legitimate news by the Western media. A related Soviet propaganda victory has been the appearance of their spokesman on American news programs. This is under the guise of giving "their side" of the story. Actually, this serves as another way for Soviet propagandists to reach otherwise unaccessible American audiences.

The KGB, Committee for State Security, controls a small part of Soviet political warfare. Its Service A of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) is responsible for covert political operations, including the dissemination of "disinformation." (Disinformation is the use of forgeries, lies and deceptions to undermine an enemy's political position.)(36)

The Propaganda Department produces propaganda within the Soviet Union. This indoctrinates the populace with Marxist-Leninism and maintains control of information.

The Soviets exploit the current anti-war and anti-nuclear weapons movements widespread in Europe and America. They use them to disarm the West. The critical thing to understand is that the Soviets do not have to disarm the West materially, by eliminating NATO's weaponry. All they need do is disarm NATO morally, by destroying the will to fight. Once this has been accomplished, NATO's weapons will become useless — worse than useless, for they become a source of guilt.

The Soviets guide the anti-war movements both directly through their political warfare organizations, and indirectly through their skillful combination of propaganda and military threat. Aside from disarming the West, these campaigns have several other advantages for the Soviets. They allow them to reach non-Communists with their propaganda. They incorporate other issues, such as El Salvador, into a general anti-war movement. And they stimulate other, non-Communist, political warfare operations by independent groups, such as civil disobedience attacks on American bases in Britain.(37)

The World Peace Council, and its subsidiary organizations, the International Institute for Peace and the International Liason Forum for Peace conduct European conferences and demonstrations against NATO theater nuclear forces modernization. They have worked with pacifist, anti-nuclear and environmentalist groups to broaden their base of operations within

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Western Europe. The World Peace Council has conducted propaganda is the United States opposing nuclear forces modernization.

The Belgian and Dutch Communist Parties have infiltrated members into non-Communist anti-war groups. The Joint Committee: Stop the Neutron Bomb – Stop the Nuclear Arms Race, which is a front of the Dutch Communist Party, sponsored an international forum in Amsterdam in November 1980. This received direction from the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This conference was attended by prominent Dutch political, religious and scientific leaders.(38)

The anti-neutron bomb campaign was a major victory for Soviet political warfare, as has already been documented.(39) Beginning in July, 1977, Soviet and Warsaw Pact press and radio, supported by the Communist Paries of Western Europe, attacked the neutron bomb as an "inhumane" weapon. In August 1977, the World Peace Council sponsored a week of action, with demonstrations outside American embassies in Europe.

In America, Communists and non-Communists formed a National Committee to welcome the leadership of the World Peace Council when they came for a "Dialog for Disarmament and Detente." Representatives of peace groups from fifty nations gathered in Geneva in February 1978. At a conference sponsored by the World Peace Council, they denounced the neutron bomb. The Soviets even mustered the Baptist clergy of the Soviet Union to appeal to President Carter to stop the bomb's production. And on April 7, 1978, President Carter cancelled the neutron bomb. One should consider the implications of this. Political warfare proved more powerful than nuclear weapons.

The Soviets effectively guide the growing anti-war movements in Europe and America, regardless of whether or not they directly conrol them. Soviet political warfare exploits the vulnerabilities of the democratic countries.

The Soviets create an environment of fear through their military preponderance. As the West rearms to meet this threat, it becomes the target of propaganda accusing NATO of accelerating the "arms race." People feel increasingly hopeless as hysteria mounts over the danger of "nuclear war." People want

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to do *something* to prevent a holocaust. And political warfare gives them an opportunity to take action.

By taking part in protests, by joining front organizations, by conducting civil disobedience against military bases, people are told they will be furthering the cause of "peace." Western governments are pressured to negotiate arms control at any price, to withdraw from NATO, to disarm unilaterally. Those who favor rearming NATO are placed on the defensive as they are accused of wanting nuclear war. By exploiting fear and hysteria, the Soviets demoralize the West and create a willingness to accept peace at any price.

The anti-war movements take on a messianic character. First, there is a threat of damnation from nuclear fires. This becomes an article of faith, not to be questioned. Woe to the heretic who claims that a limited nuclear war could be won! He will be subject to the full fury of pacifist propaganda. Then comes the promise of salvation. All one need do to prevent the holocaust is support a nuclear freeze or disarm unilaterally. It becomes a kind of secular crusade, with people marching in the streets, carrying effigies and chanting slogans as if they were litanies.

Of course, this only affects the West, since the Soviets control their own media and do not allow anti-war political operations against their own people and armed forces. Within the Soviet Union, propaganda promotes militarism and pacifism is a crime.

The Soviets advance their political control through revolutionary warfare. In recent years, Soviet supported National Liberation Fronts have defeated Western governments in Nicaragua, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique. Soviet controlled Communist Parties have seized power in Afghanistan and Ethiopia. The Soviets are now directing a major political warfare offensive against Central America.

The Soviets dominate the entire revolutionary process. The International Division controls the political and military strategy of the National Liberation Front. The Soviets have special schools to train political cadres. Lumumba University, located in Moscow, teaches Third World students political warfare techniques. Subjects include Marxist-Leninist doctrine, propaganda, gaining popular support, infiltrating the opposition, demoralizing the enemy, recruiting paramilitary forces, guerilla

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warfare and seizure of power.(40) The GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) provides further training in military tactics.

Soviet and other East bloc advisors are inserted into the leadership of the revolutionary movements to ensure direct control. This control is furher maintained by the presence of Cuban troops, which can enforce Soviet dictates. The Soviets are now willing to commit conventional forces to consolidate a revolutionary victory. In Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion occurred only after the local Communists had already seized power.

National Liberation Fronts in Central America now unify traditionally splintered leftist and moderate groups under Communist leadership. These include many traditionally anti-Communist groups, such as the Catholic Church and businessmen. This gives revolutionary activities a popular base and it makes the revolution seem to represent all of the "people." But the real power is held by the Communists, and once the revolution succeeds, the non-Communists, are purged or otherwise rendered powerless.

The Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan revolution formed the Broad Opposition Front which included democratic, labor and business representatives. In El Salvador, the Soviets have brought the various revolutionary movements under the control of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).(41)

The Soviets support their revolutionary activities with a massive propaganda campaign in Europe and the Americas. They take advantage of ignorance of the nature of revolutionary warfare among the Western populaces. Many in America and Europe assume that revolutions are the spontaneous movements of oppressed peoples. The Soviets encourage this viewpoint through the broad front tactic, as the moderate elements in the revolutions claim that their fight is for "democracy."

The Soviet media has produced a disinformation campaign against the United States' role in El Salvador. In December 1980, *Pravda* reported that American military advisors were using napalm against El Salvadorian civilians. The Soviets have also accused the U.S. of "genocide" in El Salvador.(42)

The Soviets have manipulated international organizations to support the DRU. They have targeted the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the nonaligned movement, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Inter-

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national Committee of the Red Cross, the Catholic Relief Services and the Socialist International. Their goal is to gain legitimacy for the Unified Revolutionary Directorate as the representative of the El Salvadorian people.

The DRU has called for the establishment of Solidarity Committees in the Amercias, Europe, Australia and New Zealand. These committees go by names such as the "El Salvador Solidarity Committee." They are propaganda organizations which promote the revolution's cause abroad and pressure Western governments to cut off aid to the government of El Salvador. These committees, along with local Communist Parties, have mobilized people through demonstrations, propaganda and tech-ins, against American intervention in Central America. Even now, a sizable segment of the American people are opposed to America's role in Central America as "another Vietnam."(43)

If the trends of the past continue, America and the Western world will be isolated by the Soviet political advance. If El Salvador is "another Vietnam" then a Western collapse there will lead to Communist control of Central America, as Western defeat in Vietnam led to the Communist conquest of Indochina. Soviet controlled states in Central America would become bases for insurgency throughout Latin America, and, ultimately, against the United States itself. (Already, the Cubans support Puerto Rican revolutionaries.) Soviet forces, operating from Caribbean bases, could make America's NATO position untenable.

While World War III is normally imagined as some sort of holocaust, either a massive tank battle in Central Europe or a nuclear exchange, a far more realistic scenario would be something like this:

A coalition of Communist Parties and anti-war groups form an International Peace Movement throughout Europe and America. They conduct constant demonstrations and civil disobedience against American forces in Europe, leading to the United States withdrawing from NATO. Soon after, the Soviet Union makes unacceptable demands upon West German sovereignty, such as the ceding of its border areas as a "demilitarized zone." The Peace movement supports this as the best way to avoid "another war." The Soviets explain through the Western media how they are only trying to protect themselves from

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German "aggression." The West German Chancellor appeals to other NATO countries for assistance, but they are paralyzed by fear of any conflict "escalating" to nuclear levels. The Soviets threaten to launch their armed forces westward, while the Peace movement demands "peace at any price." The American Peace movement, meanwhile, mobilizes to prevent "another Vietnam" in Europe, forcing Congress to end all military assistance to Germany. The West Germans mobilize their armed forces, but pacifist agitation leads to widescale demoralization and desertion. Unable to resist, West Germany capitulates with scarcely a shot fired in its defense. The new, Soviet domination in Europe is hailed in the world media as a "victory for peace."

Conclusion

America must recognize the nature of political warfare. Political warfare is the form of contemporary struggle. The problem is: Americans do not quite realize this. Instead, they see conflict in terms of the 19th century, as a balance of power between different nation-states. War is assumed to be a clash between armed, uniformed forces, which is decided by battle. In this perspective, political operations — propaganda, underground organizations, strikes, guerilla warfare, etc. — are an auxilliary to the regular military.

Many Americans, both liberal and conservative, tend to downgrade political operations. They are against propaganda *per se*, supposedly because it "unfairly" influences people or because it is "lies" or "manipulation."(44) Even some supporters of propaganda have little conception of its nature. They assume that all the United States need do is broadcast how bad the Communists are and the Soviet Union will come crashing down in defeat.

The conflict today is not between nation-states but between political ideologies and systems. Weapons are not tanks or aircraft carriers or nuclear missiles, but propaganda organizations and civil resistance. The Communist understand this. The West does not. And for so long as the West refuses to recognize the reality of ideological war it will remain deeply vulnerable to political attack.

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FOOTNOTES

(1) Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), vol. II, pp. 204-205.

(2) See Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New York: David McKay Company, 1970), for a complete analysis.

(3) Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 78-80.

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(14) Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 244-245.

(15) Thompson, ibid.

(16) Fanning, p. 31.

(17) Fanning, pp. 51-52.

(18) Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 399.

(19) Lewy, p. 400.

(20) Fanning, p. 121.

(21) Lewy, p. 403.

(22) Lewy, p. 404.

(23) Peter Braestrup, Big Story (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977).

(24) Robert Elegant, "How to Lose a War: Reflections of a Foreign Correspondent," *Encounter*, (August 1981, vol. 57, no. 2), pp. 73-90.

(25) Such as the deliberate shelling of South Vietnamese refugees outside of Quang Tri by North Vietnamese gunners. This caused over 20,000 civilian casualties. Sir Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not At Hand (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), p. 41.

(26) The Robert Elegant article details these fabrications.

(27) Lewy, pp. 400-401.

(28) Colonel Harry Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context,* U.S. Army War College, Carslisle Barracks, PA, 1981, pp. 7-8.

(29) For a full discussion of this matter, see Phillip Knightly, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975).

(30) Most of the information in this section is drawn from Soviet Active Measures, Hearings before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, July 13, 14, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982). This is worth reading in its entirety for a survey of current Soviet political warfare.

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(31) Hearings, pp. 34-35.
(32) Hearings, p. 224.
(33) Hearings, pp. 224-225.
(34) Hearings, p. 39.
(35) Hearings, p. 225.
(36) Hearings, p. 35.
(37) Hearings, pp. 44-45.
(38) Hearings, p. 45.
(39) John Barron, "The KGB's Magical War for 'Peace,' " *Reader's Digest* (October 1982) pp. 216-230.
(40) William Kinter and Joseph Kornfeder, The New Frontier of War (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), p. 36.
(41) R. Bruce McColm, "Central America and the Caribbean: the Larger Scenario," *Strategic Review* vol. XI, no. 3, (Summer 1983) p. 35.
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(44) Daugherty, pp. 15-16.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF SENATOR WILLIAM J. FULBRIGHT: FROM COLD WAR WARRIOR TO NEO-ISOLATIONIST

By Gary Byron Bullert and Francis Michael Casey

As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator William J. Fulbright served as perhaps the major catalyst in mobilizing opposition to the American war effort in Vietnam. During his thirty-year career in the Senate, he maintained an abiding linkage to the academic-journalistic world; he was particularly responsive to the emerging intellectual currents of opinion regarding foreign policy. Often, he would test new ideas by launching a trial balloon within the political arena. His background as a Rhodes Scholar, former president of the University of Arkansas, and sponsor of scholarship and cultural exchange programs further magnified his stature as a scholar-statesman. Indeed, Fulbright was uniquely qualified to function as a transmission belt between the festering anti-war protests of academia and the national political scene. He popularized the dissent not simply through press exposure but by greatly enhancing its credibility.

Fulbright utilized the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a polemical weapon in order to conduct a dramatic public television trial of the Vietnam War. David Halberstam aptly described these proceedings as "...a rare alliance of the media and another political institution (Congress) against the Presidency."(1) Taking his case over the head of the President and directly to the American people, Fulbright fully recognized television's crucial role in channeling public debate. In 1971, he actually drafted legislation designed to enable the Congress to have equal access to television as the President on foreign affairs. In addition, he authored several best-selling books, like *The Arrogance of Power* (1966) and *The Crippled Giant* (1971), which were effectively tailored to motivate public outrage over the war. He spoon-fed the mass media with headline-making catch phrases which could be readily digested and disseminated. Focusing upon the immediate foregound, few of his media associates were concerned with the fact that Fulbright had been

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a prominent proponent of doctrines and policies which he later castigated as myths. Fulbright's transformation from cold-war warrior to neo-isolationist was a newsworthy event as pivotal to the Vietnam War as the Tet Offensive. Just as "Vietnam" still casts an ominous shadow, neo-isolationism offers axiomatic presumptions which strongly influence the conduct of American foreign policy today.

I.

In analyzing the circumstances surrounding Fulbright's successful effort to transform the American foreign policy on Vietnam, one can detect in his long Senatorial career three dominant strains of thought: 1) 1943-46, Utopian-internationalist, 2) 1946-1964 realist-collective security, 3) 1964-1983 moralist-isolationist. These tendencies existed throughout his career through one strain predominated during a specific historical period. Emerging out of World War II, Fulbright considered the United Nations to be an instrument for world redemption which could supplant the destructive system of national sovereignty. Power politics could finally be replaced by world government and world law. This hopeful prospect was dashed by the new menace of international communism centered in the Kremlin. Up to the Cuban Missle Crisis, the worldwide struggle between the United States and the Sovet Union dominated Fulbright's approach to foreign policy. He acknowledged that a successful world organization could only operate then nations shared a basic consensus of values. Military power was mandated internationally because the world stubbornly refused to operate under "Anglo-Saxon rules of measured and orderly procedures." By 1965, however, he conceived American imperialism and arrogance of power to be the chief threat to world peace. While Soviet aggressive actions toward Europe and the Middle East coupled with a cynical violation of treaties motivated Fulbright's first paradigm shift, the Vietnam War and the police action in the Dominican Republic prompted the second major change. In the process, his twenty-year commitments and beliefs were to turn into their opposites.

II.

In 1946, the American debate over Soviet policies reached new intensity. Fulbright openly wondered whether it was the

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purpose of Russia to dominate the world through a subtle combination of infiltration and force or whether it was only seeking security. His confidence in Soviet good-will was shaken by the cumulative effect of: 1) the ruthless stripping of Manchuria, 2) extravagant demands for reparations from Italy and for bases in Tripoli and the Dardanelles, 3) annexation of the Baltic States and Polish territory, 4) vioations of pledges to establish free governments in the Balkans, 5) refusal to permit representatives of former allies to inspect any of the new territories under her control. Fulbright added that it appeared as though crusading communism was on the march.

During a Senate speech (April 7, 1947) concerned with aid to Greece and Turkey, Fulbright argued that:

> "Those critics who say that the whole matter of aid to Greece and Turkey should have been submitted to the United Nations are either naive or opposed to any aid to Greece and Turkey. It is the concentration of control in the Politburo that makes communism the real danger it is. This control coupled with the technique of infiltration and sabotage confronts us with the possibility of world domination without direct attack by force. Since it is an unfamiliar and unorthodox method of aggression, it has confused and divided democratic peoples of the world and thereby weakened their power of resistance."(2)

He had clearly broken with belief in the efficacy of the United Nations. Formulating a domino theory, Fulbright warned that Greece and Turkey were key countries to the Middle East, Southern Asia, and Africa. He reminded his colleagues that:

> "We should recognize in the beginning that we are matching strategy with an adversary who accepts no rules, and has no honor, no moral code, no respect for word or contract; who ridicules religion and believes that any means justifies the end."(3)

He insisted that the Soviet Union could not be trusted. It was an expansionist power bent on world domination and coldly calculating a new advance in Europe.

Unambiguously preceiving the Soviet threat, Fulbright repudiated any policy of appeasement and staunchly embraced the Truman Doctrine which was defined as "opposing aggression in every area where it appears."(4) By adopting collective security treaties like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

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the Kremlin would be sent an unmistakeable warning. Fulbright believed that war wasn't the result of misunderstandings or accidents but conscious decisions by an evil, lawless minority who obviously could only be contained by overwhelming military power that would deter any temptation toward aggression. In 1951, he advocated that the United States use the A-bomb on Russia if the Soviets initiated aggressive moves in Europe or the Near East. He defined aggression as "infiltration and fifth column activities designed to overthrow existing governments and establish new ones directed by Moscow." Adopting the policy of massive retaliation as well as a nuclear first-strike, Fulbright added:

> "If we don't use it (the atomic bomb) we are ruined...I think it foolish to assure Russia that we will not be the first to use the atomic bomb, I think we should let Russia think we might use it any minute."(5)

In order to prevent any Soviet miscalculations, Fulbright advised that our system of collective security treaties be made automatic. By being ironclad, such treaties would serve all the more effectively as a deterrent to aggression.

Senator Fulbright vilified isolationists and called upon Americans to accept the responsibilities of world leadership. He stated:

> "The idea seems to be that when the Communists' world begins to crumble in the distant future, we will sally forth to re-establish freedom and civilization. The thought seems to me to be a rationalization of a desired course of action rather than a serious and genuine argument. It is too obviously an attempt to justify saving oneself at the expense of others to be acceptable by any of our friends across the seas. If we accept this reasoning and voluntarily follow this course, I believe that, for the foreseeable future, we will be regarded by civilized people as unworthy of trust and confidence."(6)

Fulbright also rejected the "insidious argument" that Europe had lost its will to resist and that it was futile to try to assist her. He held that the Europeans only need assurance that within America's shifting internal politics they wouldn't be exposed to a sudden death by a repudiation of the Atlantic Treaty obligations or by a "legalistic interpretation" which would nullify the treaty's meaning. He concluded that:

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> "Whether we like it or not, ours is the only country with the prestige and power necessary to organize and lead the free peoples in opposition to the Kremlin. To refuse to accept the leadership and initiative when it is obvious that we alone among free peoples have the power to provide both seems to me to be tantamount to ultimate surrender...The masters of the Kremlin lead their slave world in no uncertain manner. Unless we can do likewise for the free world, a return to the Dark Ages is no idle fantasy."(7)

Years later, Fulbright would ridicule this policy as an arrogant attempt to play world policeman.

Throughout his career. Fulbright has been especially attentive to the issue of who should have the preponderant influence in formulating American foreign policy. During his Cold War period, he consistently sought to increase the President's authority. After the 1946 elections swept in a Republican Congress, Fulbright shocked the political world by advocating that President Truman resign from office and appoint a Republican Secretary of State. Fulbright contended that a deadlock between Congresss and the Executive would jeopardize our country's ability to present a uniform foreign policy to the world. Instead, he suggested that the Untied States adopt the British system where a new regime is constituted when the majority shifts in Parliament.(8) He then defended Truman against his critics in 1947 by insisting that the President, along with experts in the Department of State and Defense, have access to secret information which Congress cannot possess. The President's judgment should prevail.(9) In December 1950, with the country highly agitated over affairs in Asia, Senator Brewster asked Fulbright, "Does not the Senator from Arkansas recognize the provision in the Constitution with reference to the conduct of our foreign policy with the advice and consent of the Senate?" Fulbright answered, "As to appointments and treaties, not as to the formulation of policies."(10) When debate arose over troop allotments to Europe in 1951, Fulbright held that while Truman could ask for Congressional advice, his decisions did not require the consent of Congress to be validated. He added:

> "It would be dangerous for our future welfare to change the underlying principle simply because a strong minority

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> or even a majority of Congress may lack confidence in the wisdom of the Executive in some particular instance as the present one."(11)

Fearful of the populistic distrust of experts, Fulbright sought to protect the executive's prerogatives by opposing the Bricker Amendment which tried to restrict the President's treaty-making powers.(12) He argued that without confidence in their leader, the public would not make the required sacrifices to oppose the Russians successfully.

After the election of John Kennedy to the White House, Fulbright was willing to eradicate almost any formal Senate influence over foreign policy. In an era of crisis management, he proposed a virtual Presidential dictatorship which would prevent any doubts about America's treaty commitments or swift decisiveness in response to a threat. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he contended that the founding fathers had created a constitutional system of checks and balances that produced an area of conflict, not unity. The Senate had historically obstructed the President's conduct of foreign policy and the time had arrived to junk this obsolete 18th Century approach. He praised Lyndon Johnson's bi-partisan support for President Eisenhower, reasoning that:

> "It seems clear to me that in foreign affairs a Senate cannot invite or force large events or substitute its judgment of things for that of the President, without seriously jeopardizing the ability of the nation to act consistently and also without confusing the image and purpose of this country in the eyes of others."(13)

Fulbright even sought to remove the Senate's power to ratify treaties and reaffirmed the President's expansive powers as Commander-in-Chief.

He conceived the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be extraneous to the making of foreign policy decisions. It would abdicate its oversight function and serve as an educational institution which would explain and legitimatize the policies of the President. He described this role as "to explain and rationalize the burden which the people bear, to help them to that degree of understanding which will compel their agreement."(14) In 1951, Fulbright remarked, "but the Russian Communist, who disdains time, reckons it in decades and centuries. We are an emotional people. The Communist is coldbloodedly calculating.

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We are moved in our hearts. He is responsive to his head."(15) Fulbright proposed an educational program to train the public in the realities of the Cold War. In 1961, he reaffirmed the necessity to brace the American people resolutely for protracted conflict. Speaking at the Naval War College, he contended, "the overriding question is whether this nation is prepared to accept the permanent and inescapable responsibilities of having become a major power."(16) In educating the public to the burden it must bear, the President once again should have the greatest power. Fulbright affirmed that America required a charismatic leader who would give the people a "zest for action."(17) The nation should speak with one voice and that voice should be the President. Furthermore, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should shield the President from embarrassing inquiries into policy details. Its two major functions should be: 1) promote exchange of ideas between outstanding scholars and members of the Senate and 2) assist communication between universities and the government so that expert research could contribute to long-range policy formulations. Fulbright endeavored to safeguard foreign aid through bypassing the potentially obstructive Senate Appropriations Committee.

In his famous confrontations with John Foster Dulles during the 1950s, one must remember that Fulbright actually criticized Dulles for being too complacent about communism. They disagreed over means and not ends. Ridiculing the 1955 spirit of Geneva, Fulbright attacked Dulles's sanguine account of the world situation. The Soviets had merely changed tactics, not long-range objectives. Fulbright declared:

> "The changes in the Soviet Union have led directly to a position of strength which enables the new leaders to press on with renewed vigor toward the aim of world domination — and to do this by more effective means than by following the bluster, threats, and blackmail crudely employed by the Stalinists."(18)

In 1961, he warned that the struggle with Russia had entered the "critical phase" and that America's position had been "steadily receding over the past several years."(19) Fulbright claimed that Dulles consistently underestimated Soviet power and accused Dulles of "deceiving the American people about the deadly menace which confronts them." Again, he advised

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that the West be made so strong that no one would dare attack it.

During the Berlin Crisis in 1959, Senator Fulbright did not propose a policy of disengagement. He claimed that if the United States refused to hold fast in Berlin, the whole fabric of the Western Alliance would unravel and third world nations would label the West a certain loser in the Cold War. Secondly, Fulbright insisted that the United States should never honor any agreements which would formalize the subjugation of the satellite peoples of Eastern Europe. Rejecting a position based upon superior physical power, Fulbright professed the faith that eventually world opinion would prompt the Russian people to relinquish control over the once free people of Eastern Europe.(20) He reiterated that, "If we stand up to the Russians, there's little likelihood of war. On the other hand, if we run away from them, we can hardly avoid one."(21) Like John Kennedy, Fulbright endorsed an agenda which was actively interventionist, attempting to cope with the communist threat on every level: military, economic, and clandestine.

III.

While seemingly overwhelming evidence of the Soviet threat to Europe conditioned Fulbright's shift from internationalism to collective security interventionism, his justifications for abandoning containment for selective detente appear to be much more intangible. He deemed the Cuban Missile Crisis to be a truly cathartic event in world history. Fulbright supported an invasion of Cuba only if the Soviet Union utilized Cuba as a base of military operations. After the Cuban Missile Crisis and the signing of the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, he asserted that the Soviet leaders had reappraised their adventurous policies and sought an easing of tensions.(22) Though the Cold War would not end overnight, all of the ideological passion would be drained from it by a series of accommodations promotive of peaceful coexistence. With regard to Europe, the Soviet Union had become a status-quo power. He wrote:

> "Although it is too soon to render a definitive judgment, there is mounting evidence that events of recent years have wrought profound changes in the character of East-West relations. In the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the United States proved to the Soivet Union that a

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> policy of aggression and adventure involved unacceptable risks...These occurrences, it should be added, took place against the background of the clearly understood strategic superiority of the United States."(23)

The tacit Soviet acceptance of American strategic superiority was accompanied by the assurance that the United States would exercise it with responsibility and restraint, repudiating any policy of total victory.

Of course, Fulbright's assessment of these events remains highly controversial. Did the Soviet Union actually become a status-quo power? 1) The Soviet Union never accepted the American strategic superiority and has pursued a massive build-up designed to reverse totally the strategic ratio of 1962. 2) Regardless of whether the Soviet Union currently has strategic weapons in Cuba, they have undoubtedly utilized the island as a base of operations throughout Latin America for subversion. Meanwhile, Castro has supplied Russia with 50,000 proxy troops for adventurous military operations in Africa and Asia. Cuba has become a virtual extension of the Warsaw Pact. 3) While condemning black and white ideological beliefs as fomenting ideological misunderstanding, Fulbright believed that nationalism not communism was the new revolutionary force in the world, but he failed to produce any evidence that the Soviet Union had abandoned Marxist-Leninism, or that nationalism was undermining the Soviet threat against the West. As Yuri Andropov stated in 1979, "Marxist-Leninism is the textbook for achieving Socialist world revolution and the building of a new society in every country of the world."(24) The SALT Treaty, which Fulbright considered to exemplify cooperation toward the mutual goal of nuclear peace, did not emerge out of a consensus of basic values but the development of a new technological means of surveillance which rendered on-sight inspections unnecessary. Why didn't Fulbright identify peaceful coexistence and detente as but another subtle Soviet tactic to disarm the West?

The Sino-Soviet split revealed that the myth of monolithic communism was supplanted by the new reality of polycentrism. Fulbright diagnosed the nationalistic break-up of the communist world not only in Asia but also Eastern Europe. He proposed that America act with magnanimity understanding, and generosity toward China. The Taiwan issue could be resolved by

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an arrangement for Taiwanese self-government under nominal Chinese suzerainty.(25) He further believed that the Chinese would outgrow their extremist period and open up full relations with the West. While earlier advising nonrecognition of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, Fulbright held that American recognition of China was simply an acknowledgment of the existing facts. The phenomenon of nationalism within the communist orbit convinced Fulbright that the Soviet threat had substantially declined. He did not acknowledge the new reality of Soviet strategic and conventional military power, overseas military capabilities, the capture of leadership of national wars of liberation, or how proxy regimes could extend Soviet power throughout the world. While the world might no longer be strictly bi-polar, it might be more threatening to American interests.

IV.

Fulbright's position on Asian communism was characterized by a conditional containment far more elastic than his preeminent commitment to the defense of Europe. When the Chinese intervened in the Korean War, he warned of a major land war in Asia which could drain our military resources. He stated:

> "If this is the beginning of World War III, we must not forget that the Kremlin is the primary enemy and China merely a satellite. It is far wiser to recognize the hard military facts of the situation and to withdraw from Korea than to persist in an undertaking which is now quite a different one from that which we began in June. In spite of the valid principle which we sought to support, we should not jeopardize our military by pursuing an impracticable situation."(26)

When the military balance swung back towards the United Nations' forces, his position shifted.(27) In debating the MacArthur controversy, Senator Hubert Humphrey contended that:

> "Korea, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines and the line all the way down to Southeast Asia is part of the defense of the United States."

The Korean action was a vital interest. Fulbright replied that Humphrey's assessment was "entirely correct."(28) In 1954, Fulbright advocated sending American troops into Indochina.

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He approved the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Agreement which pledged to thwart communist aggression with a collective security blanket. Lyndon Johnson recalled that every Senator knew at the time what the treaty commitment meant.(29)

During the early sixties, Fulbright's position on Vietnam remained essentially an articulate defense of an interventionist policy. On June 29, 1961, he held that:

> "On balance, however, it should be said that the accomplishments of this regime (Diem) are overlooked by many observers and commentators, who all too frequently have accepted uncritically the most abusive gossip and propaganda. The term 'qualified success' could be used to describe the Americans in Vietnam as well as the Diem regime. Our aid programs have enabled the country to endorse and achieve modest progress. Yet emphasis has been too heavily weighted on the military side. Contrary to what some might believe, the Vietminh does not pretend, at the present time, to convert the South Vietnamese population to Communism....This population knows too much about Communism and does not like it."(30)

According to General Vo Nguyen Giap, Ho Chi Minh's Defense Minister, the North Vietnamese launched their strategy for subversion and conquest of South Vietnam in 1958 – before the Vietcong was ever created.

In *Old Myths and New Realities* (1964), Fulbright held that no negotiations were feasible which would preserve the independence of South Vietnam. One could not win by diplomacy what one has failed to win by warfare. Until a military situation prevailed which would buttress the basis for successful negotiation, the United States should support the South Vietnamese by the most effective means available. He warned that:

> "It should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to defend its vital interests with respect to Vietnam."(31)

He depicted the American purpose as being "to uphold and strengthen the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 – that is to say, to establish viable, independent states in Indochina and Southeast Asia which will be free and secure from the domination of Communist China and Communist North Vietnam."(32) Reaffirming the doctrine of containment, Fulbright held that communist expansionist ambitions, wherever advanced, would

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meet with the precise degree of American opposition which would be necessary to thwart them.(33) He remained committed to the doctrine of peace through strength. Fulbright did not preclude the possibility of carrying the war to North Vietnam by means of a South Vietnamese invasion.(34)

On August 6, 1964, he served as the floor manager of the Administration-sponsored Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Placing the torpedo boat attacks on an American ship in international waters within the context of communist subversive activities in Southeast Asia over the past ten years, Fulbright charged Hanoi with being "patently guilty" of military aggression and in contempt of international law. While the American retaliation was an act of great restraint, he declared:

> "An act of unambiguous aggression cannot be tolerated or ignored without inviting provocations, especially when the act is committed by a regime which has been in consistent and repeated aggression against its neighbor states... the action taken by the United States was the minimum consistent with its own vital interests and with its obligations to its allies and partners in Southeast Asia."(35)

The next day, when asked about whether secret decisions were being made concerning the war, Fulbright replied: "I do not belive there has been any tendency to withhold anything."(36) He concluded by reiterating that strong congressional support for the Administration's policies would deter psychologically any reckless adventuresome spirit by either North Vietnam or Communist China. Fulbright later insisted that he had been duped by the Administration over the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and suggested that the United States provoked the attack. This allegation was discredited by the *Pentagon Papers* which rejected any conspiracy about the incident being contrived. Fulbright was certainly aware that he was granting the Executive wide latitude in conducting the war. He stated:

> "But fundamentally under our system, it is the President as our representative in these activities, who must necessarily have the dominant role, however jealous we may be of our own privileges, and we rightly should be in many areas. But in dealing with nation's security or with threatened warfare, we must rely to a great extent on the decisions of the Executive."(37)

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution consititute Fulbright's last great

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gesture in behalf of Johnson's war policy.

V.

By the end of 1965, Fulbright's disenchantment with the Administration foreign policy, which surfaced during the Dominican Republic Crisis, spread to the Vietnam War. In order to prevent an alleged Castroite coup, President Johnson sent in 22,000 marines and paratroops who re-established law and order within 48 hours with only a handful of casualties. The Organization of American States voted 14 to 5 to send military forces commanded by a Brazilian general. The American troops were then withdrawn. This massive employment of force, reminiscent of Big Stick diplomacy, obtained its political-military objective but horrified the sensibilities of many liberals in the United States. Fulbright denounced the Dominican intervention as indicative of an appalling ignorance of the Caribbean situation. This raised new doubts about the viability of Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam War. Apparently, Fulbright attempted to persuade Johnson privately against escalation in Vietnam. With no quick victory in sight and the failure of this private diplomacy, Fulbright then launched a public crusade against the war. Earlier, he had helped to mold a policy of restraint (graduated or limited response) in Vietnam. In addition, his advice to de-ideologize the conflict was adopted which resulted in a war against Asian communism simultaneously with bridge-building toward the Soviet Union (identified as a status-quo power). This circumstance helped to render the war morally ambiguous with the sad irony that the Soviets were supplying Hanoi with massive shipments of AK-47 assault rifles and other more sophisticated weaponry to kill American servicemen. Fulbright's dissent seemed to be aggravated further by personal animosity. While Johnson was a wheeler-dealer politician, Fulbright remained aloof from the Senate club and above the merely political. His primary allegiance was to the Old Boy network of scholars and diplomats. One suspects that he had little respect for Johnson's intellectual depth.(38)

Beginning on January 28, 1966, Fulbright's Senate hearings on the Vietnam War were designed to provide the American people with countervailing information in order to expand the basis for debate and protest. He held that there were no experts on the fundamental values and objectives of foreign policy.

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While theoretically differentiating long-range goals from specific expertise on policy details, Fulbright's challenge successfully reinforced the "credibility gap" by generating distrust in both the Administration's facts and its values.

With the publication of *The Arrogance of Power* (1966), Fulbright elaborated a radically new conceptual blueprint for American policy which departed completely from his previous pronouncements. American actions in Vietnam were no longer viewed as fulfilling collective security obligations but as an act of imperialism. America's psychotic drive for power and not Soviet totalitarianism and expansion was the major international menace. With the advocacy of the Asian Doctrine and the build-up of the American military effort in Vietnam, Fulbright contended that a radical break from traditional American policy had occurred.(39) The mere increase in troops and bombing did not seem, however, to violate Fulbright's previous definition of our purpose in Vietnam. Discarding the analogy of appeasing aggression, the new operative historical model conceived the Vietnam War to be like the American Civil War with Ho Chi Minh cast as Abraham Lincoln. American policy should consist of supporting nationalism, not simply stopping communism. It didn't really matter who ruled in these backward lands; ideology was irrelevant to the poor peasants. North Vietnam was the dominant power in Indochina, not controlled by either Peking or Moscow. American security depends upon the nuclear balance, not spheres of influence or stability in the underdeveloped world.(40) While previously embracing the Rostow developmental economic approach as a means to cultivate democracy eventually within these poor nations, Fulbright now doubted whether Asians really wanted such foreign aid. He still spoke of selective involvement, but this was largely reduced to relations with Europe. A people as culturally alien as the Vietnamese weren't worth the extravagant costs required to save them.(41)

Fulbright became troubled over the domestic impact of the Vietnam War on the moral fibre of the American people. The Great Society had been corrupted into the "sick society," barbarized by the violence and carnage of the conflict and torn asunder by riots and protests. Like an Old Testament prophet, he proclaimed that the real enemy was within our own souls which were darkened by the sin of national pride and self-

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righteousness. These attitudes were outwardly expressed in the militaristic conceit that America could control history. A stable world order can never be realized when there is a country, like the United States, which is too powerful, too rich, too proud, and too arrogant. Americans must learn to feel guilty about their power since it has been ruthlessly obtained at immense moral cost.(42)

Claiming that ideological beliefs were accidental and irrational, Fulbright asserted that, "...there is no greater human vanity than the assumption that one's values have universal validity."(43) He proposed a low-profile program of cultural exchange and self-examination which would build world community on a person-to-person basis by breeding tolerance, skepticism, and mutual understanding. Wars were formented as a result of a lack of communication causing suspicion, jealousy, and fear. Mired in a relativistic self-doubt, America's turn inward would preclude as a preeminent taboo the unilateral application of military power abroad. Fulbright voiced the need for an expanded United Nations' role and sought to channel American foreign aid through international agencies in order not to arouse resentment from other nations about receiving our charity. He had clearly distanced himself from earlier sense of mission which prompted him to remark:

> "Too many people in our nation don't believe anything with conviction. They question the precepts of God or of man indiscriminately. The values of life which were clear to the Pilgrims and the founding fathers have become dim and fuzzy in outline. False propaganda and the 'big lie' of demagogues have created doubt in the minds of men."(44)

Such a simple-minded faith today would arouse Fulbright's cynical wrath.

A corollary to the distrust of experts is the conspiratorial danger of the military-industrial complex undermining American democratic life. In 1951, when Senator Taft questioned the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the MacArthur controversy, Fulbright rose in the Senate to declare:

> "I can think of nothing which is more likely to cause consternation in this country, to develop a fear when I believe the facts do not warrant and generally to disrupt our effort in this great struggle with Communism than to state here that in effect he (Taft) has no confidence in

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> the integrity of the leading military figures of our government."(45)

In 1961, Fulbright stirred up the "muzzle the military" debate by attempting to restrict the so-called propaganda public relations activities of the military. In an effort to strifle right-wing dissent, he charged that the military was "doing a disservice both to the American people and the armed services when they lend their support to any groups or organizations which espouse policies that run counter to those of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and which have the effect of generating distrust and suspicion among our people."(46) Why didn't the military men have a higher patriotic duty to dissent, especially if freedom of speech was embraced as categorically as Fulbright did during the 1950s? Doesn't the American public have the right to know? Who is to determine what is or is not propaganda in the free marketplace of ideas?

Fulbright's anathema toward the military was vehemently expressed in *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine* (1967). He wrote:

> "We cannot, without doing outselves the very injury that we seek to secure ourselves against from foreign adversaries, pursue policies which rely primarily on the threat or the use of force because policies of force and the preeminence given to the wielders of force (the Military) are inevitably disruptive of democratic values."(47)

We cannot engage in the barbarous actions of war without becoming barbarous ourselves. He depicted the "military mind" as being incapable of making balanced judgments about politics. Since military decisions were impersonal, individual officers did not accept responsibility for their actions. Most military officers, however, have college degrees; they have not been insulated from alien ideas. Dissent within the armed services demonstrates a capacity to think critically as well as reflecting the same stresses which exist within American society at large. Yet, the military became the focus of criticism of many intellectuals during the Vietnam War.(48)

By 1966, Fulbright reversed himself on the Senate's role in foreign policy. He affirmed that the Senate "has the responsibility to review the conduct of foreign policy by the President and his advisers, to render advice whether it is solicited or not,

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and to grant or withhold its consent to major acts of foreign policy."(49) The Senate should serve as an adversarial forum, linking American critics of the war to the policy-makers in Washington. Previously, Fulbright professed a profound distrust of public opinion influencing foreign policy. He characterized isolationists as tender-minded political escapists seeking "the pre-natal security of the womb." Once more, he revealed a predilection for attacking his opponents in psycho-analytical terms. Even though heated debate in the Senate gave the indication of deep American division, Fulbright insisted upon his higher patriotic duty to speak out against mad policies. He helped to draft legislation designed to circumscribe the Executive's role in foreign policy. Even if the President was not personally corrupt through conscious deceit over the war, Fulbright held that the President became estranged from reality by the cloistered life in the White House. This bred delusions that were dangerous to world peace.

During the 1960s, Fulbright fashioned a curious double standard regarding political dissent. In 1965, when the Young Americans for Freedom pressured an American company to stop construction of a rubber plant in Rumania, he exclaimed:

> "It is very disturbing, however, very disturbing and very mischievous when private groups or businesses or individuals take it upon themselves by act or omission, to alter or dictate or defeat official policies of the U.S. Government directly and not through our duly constituted governmental agencies such as Congress. This amateur policy-making can be accomplished by almost any group or organization endowed with the convinction that it knows more about some aspect of foreign policy than anybody else and with the will to intimidate officials and other organizations that are not hard to intimidate."(50)

Besides a fatherly reprimand that student demonstrators should dissent in an orderly manner because nonviolence was more effective, Fulbright embraced exuberantly the Vietnam protest movement. He defended the dissenters as a profound expression of the national conscience who were animated by traditional American idealism, discarding a corrupted politics of expediency with a vision of purity.(51)

Fulbright charged that the war was poisoning and brutalizing American domestic life. He credited the protestors with recog-

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nizing that, "...it is ultimately self-defeating to 'fight fire with fire,'' that you cannot defend your values in a manner that does violence to those values without destroying the very thing you are trying to defend."(52) This pacifist rhetoric implies that any military action would imperil America's democratic health. This definitely wasn't Fulbright's attitude toward World War II, which he termed a "creative war." Fulbright argued that, "they (the protesters) are not really radical, these young idealists, no more radical than Jefferson's idea of freedom, Lincoln's idea of equality, or Wilson's idea of a peaceful community of nations."(53) How does a communist takeover of Southeast Asia embody freedom, equality, or a peaceful community of nations? Fulbright placed his bet on this younger generation to provide the moral leadership, to set an example for the world in democracy and human dignity. By 1969, his disillusion had reached the point where he doubted America could even set a moral example.

Fulbright's paradigmatic shift from cold warrior to neo-isolationist was symptomatic of the general collapse of a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. The pervasive ideological temper of the war debate has left precious little ground for conciliation or compromise. The deep cleavage between the two approaches to American foreign policy by Fulbright can be summarized in the following developments:

1. A change in his view of Congressional-Presidential relations – from personal to institutional;
2. A reformation of his view of Presidential power from one of crisis management, executive domination and elite control to that of congressional restrictions, criticism and input from nongovernmental groups and individuals;
3. A change in Fulbright's threat perception wherein the chief enemy switches from Soviet totalitarian aggression to American imperialism characterized by an arrogance of power and the threat of an imperial presidency and military establishment;
4. A restatement of the role of the United States in international affairs from that of defender of the free world, striving to prevent war and to assist in the economic and political development of the Third World, to a role of providing an international moral example, to avoid war and to demonstrate a great concern for the quality of

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domestic life;

5. An evolution in Fulbright's view of the ends of American foreign policy from the containment of communism by the maintenance of an international balance of power to a civilizing of world politics through appeals to world public opinion, establishment of educational and cultural exchanges and to the establishment of detente with the Soviet Union;

6. A change in Fulbright's emphasis on required elite influence from that of career professional diplomat and military-industrial leaders to that of the academic, news-media journalist or clerical spokesman;

7. A reconstruction of his view of the source of global conflict from conscious Soviet Russian designs for world hegemony to international musunderstanding and ideological fixations;

8. And finally a change in Fulbright's perception of value structure from that of a clear simple moral certainty to one of relativism, ambiguity and paradox.

Accordingly, Senator Fulbright has assumed the peculiar historical status of being an articulate and foreful expositor of both of these foreign policy approaches.

FOOTNOTES

(1) David Halberstam, "CBS: The Power and the Profits," *Atlantic Monthly* (February, 1970), p. 74.

(2) *Congressional Record* (June 3, 1947), p. 6248.

(3) *Congressional Record* (Jan. 22, 1951), p. 521.

(4) Ibid.

(5) *Arkansas Gazette* (31 January 1951), p. 1.

(6) *Congressional Record* (January 22, 1951), p. 521. During World War II, Fulbright caustically referred to "appeasement idiocy and isolationist dreams." He criticized the "weasling, timid, and fearful policy of the isolationist senators" as being "one of the greatest dangers to our true interests." He concluded, "it is far better to fight for and to lose than merely to acquiesce." H. Johnson and B. Gwertzman, *Fulbright: The Dissenter* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 46-47.

(7) *Congressional Record* (Jan. 22, 1951), p. 521.

(8) Johnson and Gwertzman, pp. 103-105.

(9) *Congressional Record* (April 7, 1947), p. 3137.

(10) *Congressional Record* (December 18, 1950), p. 16894.

(11) *Congressional Record* (January 22, 1951), p. 520.

(12) K. Meyer, *Fullbright of Arkansas* (Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1963), p. 127.

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(13) Meyer, p. 20.

(14) Ibid., p. 271.

(15) *Congressional Record* (April 26, 1951), p. 4401. In *The Arrogant of Power,* Fulbright would describe communism as "a doctrine of social justice and a product of western civilization, philosophically rooted in humanitarian protest against the injustices of nineteenth century capitalism." pp. 80-81.

(16) Meyer, p. 244.

(17) Meyer, p. 271.

(18) Meyer, p. 94.

(19) Fulbright, "U.S. Foreign Policy," *Vital Speeches* (June 29, 1961), p. 616.

(20) Fulbright, "The Position of the U.S. in the Berlin Crisis," *Vital Speeches* (April 1, 1959), p. 362-3.

(21) *Northwest Arkansas Times* (25 September 1948), p. 1.

(22) Fulbright, *Old Myths and New Realities* (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 62-63.

(23) Ibid., pp. 4-5.

(24) Albert Weeks and William Bodie, ed., *War and Peace: Soviet Russia Speaks* (New York: National Security Information Center, Inc., 1983), p. 32.

(25) Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power* (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 198. "Suzerainty" was the term utilized to define China's historical relationship to Tibet by western scholars. While Fulbright downplayed Chinese aggression in Tibet, as suzerainty collapsed into sovereignty, his comments in 1958 revealed a different story. He stated, "there is as well a brutal repudiation by the Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai of the principles of nonviolence and nonintervention in other countries' internal affairs that he made at the 1955 Brandung Conference of Asian Nations...There is little we can do to succor a Tibet in agony. But our deepest feelings are negaged, for although we are not of the Buddhist faith, it is nonetheless true that he who lays rough hands on the followers of Buddha lay rough hands on all who believe in freedom of worship, independence of spirit, and the dignity of man. Our nation is founded upon these principles. It has never departed from them. It has never ceased to hope that they will become the guiding principles of all peoples of the world. Hence, our national sorrow that they are being stifled today in the devout and brave country of Tibet by Communist China. Fulbright, "The Oppression of Tibet by Communist China," *Congressional Record* (April 8, 1959), p. 5491. In 1960, the International Commission of Jurists found Communist China guilty of genocide in Tibet. Fulbright also tended to shift his historical understanding of the Cold War in order to accommodate current foreign policy fashions by incorporating some of the revisionist historical work on the Cold War.

(26) Johnson and Gwertzman, p. 119.

(27) Fulbright's recollection of his position on the Korean War also became blurred. In *The Arrogance of Power,* he wrote, "we went to war in 1950 to defend South Korea against the Russian-inspired aggression of North Korea. I think that American intervention was justified and necessary: we were defending a country that clearly wanted to be defended, whose army was willing to fight and fought well, whose government though dictatorial, was patriotic and commanded the support of the people." (p. 14). Fulbright neglected to mention that all of the arguments he later used against American intervention in Vietnam were employed, at the time, by others concerning Korea. Syngman Rhee was a corrupt puppet dictator; the South Koreans wouldn't fight; Korea is one country anyway; ideology is irrelevant to backward peoples, etc.

(28) *Congressional Record* (April 26, 1951), p. 4405.

(29) Lyndon Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), p. 48.

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(30) *Vital Speeches* (January 29, 1971), p. 618.
(31) *Old Myths and New Realities,* p. 44.
(32) Ibid.
(33) *Congressional Record* (August 6, 1964), p. 18400.
(34) *Old Myths and New Realities,* pp. 41-44.
(35) *Congressional Record* (August 6, 1964), pp. 18399-18400. Fulbright authorized an investigation of the Tonkin Gulf incident in the fall of 1967. See Johnson and Gwertzman, p. 197.
(36) *Congressional Record* (August 7, 1964), p. 18457.
(37) *Congressional Record* (August 7, 1964), p. 18462. Of historical and political interest was the contention of certian Senators that they were unaware of the implications of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. In the lengthy debate, some searching questions were asked: "Mr. Brewster: ...So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China. Mr. Fulbright: There is nothing in the resolution as I read it that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that this is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander-in-Chief feels is necessary. It would not restrain the Executive from doing it. Whether or not that should ever be done is a matter of wisdom under the circumstances that exist at the particular time it is contemplated. This kind of question should be more properly addressed to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee." *Congressional Record* (August 6, 1964), p. 11403. Johnson and Gwertzman conveniently stopped their discussion after the first two sentences of Fulbright's statement. See p. 197.
(38) This was Fulbright's description of the Goldwater candidacy in 1964: "if Senator Goldwater is at all sincere in his proposals – and I see no reason at all to question his personal conviction and commitment – then it is possible, indeed probable, that his policies as President would revive the cold war, generate new international conflicts, and lead the nation from one crisis to another and sooner or later to the disaster of nuclear war." Fulbright, "Dangerous Delusions," *Saturday Review* (October 24, 1964), p. 24.
(39) *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 110.
(40) *Congressional Record* (April 2, 1970), p. 10151. The sole reliance upon the nuclear deterrent seems reminiscent of the "fortress America" brand of isolationism.
(41) Ibid., p. 10157.
(42) *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 22.
(43) *Old Myths and New Realities,* p. 67.
(44) Meyer, p. 27.
(45) *Congressional Record* (April 26, 1951), p. 4402.
(46) Meyer, p. 232.
(47) Fulbright, *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine* (New York: Liveright Co., 1970), p. 14.
(48) Ibid., p. 140.
(49) *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 44.
(50) *Congressional Record* (October 22, 1965), p. 18226-34.
(51) *The Arrogance of Power,* p. 135.
(52) Fulbright, "The Price of Empire," *Vital Speeches* (August 8, 1967), p. 681.
(53) Ibid., p. 682.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH NATION

BY

H. MUNRO CHADWICK,
Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge

Based upon classical documentary sources, H.M. Chadwick's *The Origin of the English Nation* remains one of the great authoritative source books on the ethnological and cultural origins of the English – a people who gave their character to so many modern English-speaking nations around the world. The text commences with a description of England in the Sixth Century, analysing Celtic as well as Angle, Saxon, Jute and Frisian roots. The ethnic groups which contributed to the founding of the English nation are further compared and contrasted with corresponding peoples on the European continent, who founded the modern nations of Europe. *The Origin of the English Nation* thus provides invaluable insight into the nature and character of the modern peoples of Europe, as well as into that of the numerous English-speaking peoples of our contemporary world.

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ETHNIC GROUPS IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS
Nathan Glazer and Reed Ueda
Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C. 1983.

One element of the American civil rights movement that came to the fore in the 1970s was a strong assertion of racial pride within the country's largest racial minority, the blacks. A similar development occurred among other ethnic groups that had been subjected to prejudice and discrimination, notably American Indians and Hispanics.

In response to this new consciousness, textbook publishers sought to correct the neglect of these ethnic minorities in history textbooks used in American high schools. The question subsequently arose: Was their reaction too extreme? Was the story of blacks, Indians, Asians, Hispanics, and other ethnic groups now exaggerated? Was there now too much emphasis on their tribulations? Was the role of the "white" majority too severely condemned? And, in refocusing the historical camera, did the textbook authors and editors lose sight of the central, unifying themes of our national history?

Glazer and Ueda measured the proportion of space devoted to ethnic groups in the texts. They found a range of 5.4 to 11.6 percent which they do not consider excessive. The problem was not in the amount of coverage but in its overall tone. The old myths of racial inferiority implicit in American texts of the twenties and thirties have been replaced by new myths proclaiming the superior moral qualities of minorities. In a kind of Machiavellian inversion, whites are portrayed as malevolent and blacks, Indians, Asians, and Hispanics as tragic victims. The texts emphasize discrimination, prejudice, and victimization of selected minorities.

The new histories foster a new civic morality whose major ingredients are an understanding of and respect for the humanity of disadvantaged minorities. By describing the social and

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cultural history of ethnic groups, the texts supply what might be called a basic level of "ethnic literacy." But it is very basic indeed. It emphasizes the positive features of each group, and elicits sympathy by vividly picturing the efforts of ethnic minorities to defend themselves from discrimination and to advance under inhospitable circumstances. Inevitably, this emphasis on discrimination and prejudice and on the struggle against oppression reduces the stature of the "white" majority, still the main protagonist of these histories.

The new texts have as yet found no way of incorporating any sophisticated or complex view of the white European immigrants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This lack inevitably sharpens the disjunction between "oppressors" and "oppressed," and tends on occasion to reduce American history to only that.

Ultimately, when textbooks portray the history of ethnic groups as a repeated struggle between victims and oppressors – between subject and dominant peoples – the central processes that integrated American society are trivialized. For example, the student receives no sense of the impact of public schooling on the social and economic mobility of ethnic groups, of the relation of black migration to public efforts to combat discrimination, or of the role of immigrants in broadening American religious institutions. In concentrating narrowly on ethnic conflict the new history slights the forces that have created common bases of group experience and group interests that transcend ethnic lines.

It is hard to believe that such one-sided approaches will do much to engage students. They live in a world in which school bussing is an ever-present reality and affirmative action affects almost every civil servant and employee of a major organization; a world in which Democrats and Republicans alike eschew harsh and punitive measures in dealing with illegal immigration; a world in which they see Asian schoolmates advancing and new Asian immigrants beginning to progress through the cycles of past immigrants. What will they then make of histories that speak only of victims and exploiters in dealing with racial and ethnic minorities? Students can approach such histories only, one feels, with skepticism and incomprehension – or, if they put aside their living experience, they can only fall victim to misleading ideologies.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM

Charles C. Josey
The Cliveden Press, Washington, D.C., 1983

Originally published in the year 1923, under the title of *Race and National Solidarity,* this book provides a revealing exposition of the racial and nationalist philosophies that loomed large in European and North American politics in the 1920s and 1930s. As a consequence, a study of his work – which is logically consistent and scholarly, as Josey (a professor of psychology at Dartmouth College) was a moderately prominent scholar in his day – is virtually essential to understanding the psychology of Germany and certain other European nations in the 1930s, and *also* of Japan in this present decade. Essentially he determines that most people attempt to be both nationalists and internationals at the same time, whereas the two ideologies are ultimately irreconcilable: "Great as is the lack of unity and harmony in the realm of politics, economics, and business, the lack is probably even greater in the realm of ideals and ethics. In fact, the lack of unity and harmony in the realm of ideals is largely responsible for the lack of unity elsewhere observed. Europe and countries with European culture are being torn by conflicting values and ideals. On the one hand, there are the narrow values of a restricted nationalism, which find expression in the selfishness and jealousies that are disrupting Europe. On the other hand, there are the values of a broad humanitarianism which seeks to found a world-culture on principles that know nothing of patriotism, group loyalty, or pride in race. These values are clearly opposed. Yet we do not find men consciously accepting one set and rejecting the other. They try to take both."

Having stated this position clearly, the author then proceeds to defend nationalism and to attack the doctrine of internationalism and free trade as weakening the resistance of western nations to the growing power of the non-white populations:

"Internationalists try to convince us in a number of ways that the ideals of internationalism, if put into practice, will serve our good. They argue that internationalism will increase the good of the world. Consequently, our good will increase. They point to the dangers of nationalism. They point to the great savings that can be made when nations can discard their

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naval and military establishments. They love to draw lessons from history in support of their views. They depict the dwarfing effect of nationalism on character. They hold before our eyes the dazzling prospect of living with all men in mutual help, sympathy, and love. They arouse our fears by telling us that unless we abandon our nationalism, we, like the nations of the past, shall fall. They appeal to our idealism by arousing the deep-lying and noble sentiments of humanity and brotherly love. Let us be sure that the dazzling prospect they offer is more than a mirage.

"What of the appeal to history they love to make? They tell us that nations fall on account of national arrogance, social decay, and militarism. Nationalism is a value which, like all values, may lead to strife. Men are willing to fight to safeguard this value. They may be defeated in their struggle to defend it, and one may say that a nation fell on account of its nationalism. If, however, we should reject nationalism on this account, it would be necessary to reject many of our other values. It is possible, of course, as stated above, that an extreme development of nationalism may lead to social decay. It may involve a sort of isolation that is not conducive to progress, and it may become a value or means to hide under cover many internal social abuses. This may cause the decline of a nation. Yet what element of social decay has been more powerful in bringing about the decline of nations than the breaking down of group loyalties? History, when rightly read, warns us against the ideals of internationalism. It teaches us that nations *may fall* on account of social decay. It teaches us that nations *certainly fall* when group loyalty is destroyed. Was not the decay of group loyalty the cause of the fall of Greece and Rome? Is not the lack of group loyalty largely responsible for the present plight of China and India? When groups become weak through vice or the destruction of loyalties, they become an easy prey of the group with greater strength and loyalty."

As a psychologist, the author is not directly interested in questions of race differences. He is concerned, however, with the importance of national group loyalty and the destructive influence of the concept of class warfare arising *within* a nation: "Our intense craving for peace and our desire to believe the internationalist's promises of peace trustworthy, when examined in the light of modern society, become pathetic. In

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order to free ourselves from all friction and strife based on race and national consciousness, we attempt to destroy these, without realizing that as they become weaker, brutal passions and hatreds of an intensified class feeling take their place.... Today our society is torn with class struggle. Labor and large portions of our people are demanding that the exploitation of the workers shall cease and that property rights be greatly restricted. As a result the struggle between classes goes on with ever-increasing intensity. The stability of our social structure is in danger of being seriously shaken. Unless something is done to correct these conditions we may very well fear for our future. This is a time which demands a group loyalty that shall make, if need be, sacrifices for the good of the group. Yet just at the time that we need a loyalty firmer than ever, internationalists attempt to destroy national and race consciousness. Some of them do this in order to clear the ground for the final struggle between capital and labor. They know that as long as national loyalties are vigorous, men will hesitate a long time before pursuing a policy that threatens seriously the welfare of their country. Hence, nationalism must be destroyed in order that the class struggle may assume its final form.

"The pathetic aspect of the situation is that many Christian internationalists do not recognize this. They tell us, and many believe them, that when national and race jealousies, hatreds, and frictions are removed, an era of peace will result. Here is a case of internal disorder based on economic factors. Will the complete removal of the feelings of nationalism, race pride, and group consciousness, think you, be helpful in bringing about domestic peace? The most elementary knowledge of social psychology makes impossible the entertainment of such hopes.

"Already, in many circles, as has been pointed out, allegiance to one's class is regarded as more sacred than allegiance to nation. We many expect a long and bitter class struggle under any conditions. Yet under certain conditions the bitterness can be eliminated to a greater extent than under others. The internationalists under the guise of offering world peace advocates the conditions most favorable to making the struggle one of utmost bitterness."

Here we have laid out before us an explanation of the intense nationalism that motivated Germany, Italy and other European counties in the 1930s. It is an aid to the proper comprehension

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of present history as well. What the author has to say of the philosophy of the nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s is equally true of Japanese, Chinese and Afro-Asian nationalism of the 1970s and 1980s. This is not simply a historical work – it is a living textbook helping us to comprehend the real world of the present.

WELFARE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
Martin Anderson
The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978

Since the middle of the 1960s, welfare reform has been a major issue on the political agenda of the United States. Every year tens of billions of dollars of the taxpayer's money are redistributed to millions of low-income Americans. Yet in spite of this massive effort to help the poor, welfare has remained the center of a swirling controversy. And all attempts to radically reform our welfare system have failed.

Writing in a clear, logical style that is increasingly rare in policy analyses, Anderson draws on his background in economics and his experience in the White House to explain and analyze the essence of the welfare reform debate. He presents eight major theses that define the central issues of the welfare reform controversy, and concludes that radical welfare reform is politically impossible in our society today.

Asking why all attempts to radically reform the welfare system – by some of the brightest persons in academia and government – have failed, he writes: "What appears to be a welfare reform stalemate results primarily from the conflict between what an elite group of welfare intellectuals wants and what the general public wants." Anderson draws the conclusion that welfare reform will succeed only when it conforms to what the American people want: Aid for the needy-only. The elimination of fraud and abuse. A fair, clear work requirement. And effective and efficient administration. To accomplish these goals he proposes a seven-point program for workable welfare reform.

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POLITICAL PILGRIMS: TRAVELS OF WESTERN INTELLECTUALS TO THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND CUBA
Paul Hollander
Harper Colophon Books, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1981.

Why have noted Western intellectuals – from George Bernard Shaw to Jean-Paul Sartre to Susan Sontag – embraced the vision of various "revolutionary" societies, often in their most repressive historical phase, while downgrading (and yet enjoying) the benefits of life in freedom-loving Western cultures? Have their eulogies of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba and other socialist states contributed to a moral double standard? Paul Hollander explores these crucial questions in a remarkable study of travel reports on socialist countries written by Western visitors. Observing that political pilgrims represent a tradition of seeking alternatives to flawed social arrangements at home, Hollander also suggests that underlying these visits is a quest for meaning, purpose, and sense of community that intellectuals feel increasingly deprived of in secular and individualistic societies in the West. *Political Pilgrims,* listed among "The Notable Books of the Year" in the *New York Times Book Review,* is a provocative study of the relationship beteeen political commitment, perception, and moral sensibility.

Even if some readers fail to see this work as an expose of the naivety of liberal Western intellectuals, who see only what they want to see (and are carefully prevented by their totalitarian hosts from seeing anything else, or even communicating freely with chance contacts), the author undeniably provides us with well-documented accounts of the way the Soviet, Cuban and Communist Chinese systems tackle the problem of handling visitors to their countries.

UNDERMINING CAPITALISM: STATE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIALECTIC OF CONTROL IN THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY
Joel Krieger
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1983

Beginning with the nationalized British coal industry and then raising more general issues concerning the contemporary

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state, Joel Krieger studies the day wage structure for face workers (National Power Loading Agreement) introduced by the National Coal Board in 1966, its consequences, and the ways in which earlier work conventions, wage structures, and social relations affected it. Why did the "perfect" bureaucracy fail in its most critical policy initiative? In answering this question Professor Krieger shows how state policy implementation leads to a dialectic of control in which even the best rationalizing strategies serve to undermine capitalism.

ANCIENT EUGENICS
A.G. Roper
The Cliveden Press, Washington, D.C.

The ancient Greeks and Romans still stand virtually unequalled for their intellectual, cultural, economic, political and military accomplishments. These achievements were accomplished only because of their high biological heritage. In the early centuries, at the time of their full vitality and vigor, both Greeks and Romans were conscious of the need to preserve their inherited qualities, and developed simple but realistic eugenic concepts. As the Spartan Lycugus wrote "If the parents are strong the children will be strong." Fully appreciating the role of environment in the development of man, they provided for both intellectual and physical schooling, but observed that "the fairest gift that one can give children is to be born of noble parents." Sparta, in particular, aimed at creating a breed of supermen, and of comely beautiful women. No amount of education, the classical Greeks believed, could "transform the bad child of evil stock." At the same time it was the duty of all healthy and fit men and women to have children so that the race might survive the ravages of war. "A man," said Socrates "has a two-fold duty: towards his wife, to cherish her who is to raise up children along with him, and towards children yet unborn, to provide things that will contribute to their well-being." Evidence of early Greek and Roman child exposure is discussed and the text examines in detail the eugenic concepts of both Greek and Roman writers.

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TABLE 1

Percentage of Elementary Pupils Attending Private Schools by Continent and Nation (N=144)

I. Africa (N=38)	%
Algeria	0.2
Benin	3
Botswana	4
Burundi	48
Chad	5
Comoro	1
Djibouti	7
Egypt	9
Equitorial Guinea	25
Ethiopia	15
Gabon	41
Gambia	13
Ghana	2
Ivory Coast	14
Kenya	0.1
Liberia	26
Libya	2
Madagascar	19
Malawi	8
Mali	4
Mauritius	25
Morocco	3
Niger	3
Nigeria	20
Reunion	6
Senegal	11
Seychelles	3
Sierra Leone	44
Somalia	2
Sudan	1
Swaziland	44
Togo	20
Tunisia	1
Cameroun	27
Tanzania	0.04
Upper Volta	8
W. Sahara	8
Zambia	1

II. Asia (N=31)	%
Bahrain	8
Bangladesh	13
Brunei	20
Cyprus	2
Kampuchea	2
Hong Kong	48
Indonesia	19
Iran	7
Iraq	4
Japan	0
Jordan	6
Rep. of Korea	1
Kuwait	14
Laos	10
Lebanon	37
Macau	47
Peninsula of Malaysia	0.03
Sabah	26
Sarawak	29
Maldives	32
Oman	1
Philippines	5
Qatar	1
Saudi Arabia	3
Singapore	26
Sri Lanka	1
Syria	5
Thailand	9
Turkey	9.4
United Arab Emirates	15
Yemen	1

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TABLE 1
(continued)

III. Europe (N=22)	%	IV North/Central America (N=27)	%
Andorra	23	Antigua/Baruda	17
Austria	3	Barbados	3
Belgium	34	Belize	2
Denmark	8	Bermuda	14
France	13	Brit. Virgin Islands	15
Fed. Rep. of Germany	1	Canada	12
Gibralter	8	Caymen Islands	25
Greece	6	Costa Rica	3
Iceland	1	Dominica	11
Italy	7	Dominican Rep.	11
Luxembourg	1	El Salvador	6
Malta	22	Grenada	44
Monaco	23	Guadelupe	5
Netherlands	41	Guatemala	13
Norway	1	Hati	37
Portugal	6	Honduras	5
Spain	27	Jamaica	3
Sweden	0.6	Martinique	4
Switzerland	4	Mexico	5
England/Wales	4	Montserrat	13
N. Ireland	33	Netherlands Antilles	46
Scotland	2	Nicaragua	9
		Panama	6
		Puerto Rico	8
		St. Pierre Miquelon	38
		United States of America	10*
		U.S. Virgin Islands	18

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TABLE 1
(continued)

V. Oceania (N=14)	%	VI. South America (N=12)	%
American Samoa	13	Argentina	15
Australia	18	Bolivia	8
Fiji	48	Brazil	11
Fr. Polynesia	20	Chile	17
Guam	13	Colombia	13
Kiribati	2	Equador	14
New Caledonia	24	Fr. Guiana	12
New Zealand	8	Paraguay	12
Pacific Island	9	Peru	11
New Guinea	40	Suriname	37
Samoa	13	Uruguay	14
Solomon Islands	13	Venezuela	10
Tonga	6		
Vanuatu	21		

Source: United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Commission, Paris, France, 1982.

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TABLE 2

Current Proposals for Education Tax Credits at the U.S. Federal Level

Date	1982	Proposal announced on April 15th, 1982
Sponsor(s)	Senators Packwood and Moynihan	President Reagan
Value of Tax Credit	Limited to 50% of the private school's tuition charge and $500 maximum.	Limited to 50% of tuition paid, with ceilings rising from $100 in 1983 to $500 in 1985.
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